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Understanding the Absence of a Duty To
Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law
Marin Roger Scordato"
The absence in American tort law of a duty to reasonably aid a stranger in peril is
perplexing It is an odd gap in the otherwise nearly pervasive presence of a duty of reasonable
cam in the modem law of negligence. It utterly fails to accurately articulate our conventional
sense ofmorality and appropriate social behavior It stands in stark contrast to the treatment of
this issue throughout the rest of the world It is a rle of tort law for which very few
commentators have had a kind word
ThisAi'cle sets forth a spirited defense of the traditional no-duty-to-rescue rule. It offers
a thoroughgoingjustification for the doctrine and establishes an understanding of the practical
wisdom behind its seemingly amoral veneer It is a unique attempt in the existing legal literature
to develop a clear and unapologetic rationale for this much maligned aspect oftot law
The argument begins by analyzing the likely benefits available from the adoption ofa tort
duty to affirmatively aid It then identiies and describes the probable costs that would
accompany such a rule, inclu&ng the lowering of the quality of rescue effort experienced by
those in peril, the discounting of altmism, greater intrusiveness of negligence regulation, an
increased risk of harm to rescuers, the creation of a disincentive to cooperate in subsequent
investigations and a deterrence to provide delayed aid In addion, the manyproblems attendant
to the actual operation of a duty to affirmatively aid within the negligence cause of action am
considered
The question of whether a limited version ofa duty to affitrmatively aid that would apply
only to persons who possess special expertise or experience in providing aid is also analyzed as
is the role of Good Samarizan statutes in creating appropriate incentives for such indvduals.
Finally, the characteristics of a criminal law duty to rescue am compared to those of a tort law
duty and both the relative desirability of a criminal law duty and the superluous nature of a
subsequent tort law duty are demonstrated
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I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after noon on January 2, 2007, Wesley Autrey, a fifty-
year-old construction worker, was waiting for the subway at 137th
Street and Broadway in New York City.' He was with his two young
daughters, ages four and six.2 Not far from them on the platform was
1. Cara Buckley, A Man Down, a Train Arving, and a Stranger Makes a Choice,
N.Y ThMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at Al; Emi Endo & Andrew Strickler, Hero 'Overwhelmed' with
Gifts, Accolades, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 2007, at A2; see also Diane Cardwell, Subway Rescuer
Receives the Citys Highest Award N.Y TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at B6 (noting the praise and
accolades Autrey received after the dramatic rescue); Clyde Haberman, At Least the Hero
Was on Time, N.Y TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2007, at B1 (reporting on Autrey's rescue and the frequency
with which illness causes subway delays); Trymaine Lee & Cassi Feldman, Construction
Worker One Day, Subway Hero the Nex' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at B 1 (reporting on the
rescue and public response).
2. See Buckley, supra note 1.
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Cameron Hollopeter, a twenty-year-old film student.' Hollopeter
suffered a sudden seizure that caused him to collapse, and after
unsteadily getting to his feet, he stumbled backward over the edge of
the platform onto the tracks below.4  With the No. 1 train quickly
approaching, Autrey jumped down and pressed himself and Hollopeter
tightly into a space between the tracks little more than a foot deep.'
The train, unable to stop, rumbled over Autrey and Hollopeter, mere
inches above them, smudging Autrey's knit cap with grease.6 Both
men emerged alive and largely uninjured from the ordeal.7
Just two days later in a different borough of the same city during
the same noon hour, three-year-old Timothy Addo crawled through the
window of his babysitter's apartment in the Bronx and out onto a fire
escape.8 The child climbed down one story and ended up dangling
from the metal structure four floors above the sidewalk, rapidly losing
his grip.9 Two lifelong friends, forty-three-year-old Julio Gonzalez and
forty-year-old Pedro Nevarez, spotted the child and ran across the
street, positioning themselves under the fire escape just as Timothy let
loose and fell."° The child landed hard on Nevarez's chest, knocking
Nevarez onto the sidewalk." Timothy was then caught in the air by
Gonzalez who maintained his hold on the forty-five-pound child.'2
Neither man was seriously injured, and Timothy was released from the
hospital after being treated for minor scrapes.'3 Later in the day, New
York City Police Commissioner Raymond W Kelly said, "This is a
week of heroes here in New York."'4
It was not nearly the same kind of week in New York City some
forty years earlier when the borough of Queens was the setting of what
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id.
7. Id A similar subway rescue occurred in March 2008. See Nicole Lyn Pesce,
Hero Races 1 Train, Saves a Life: New Subway Superman Flies To Rescue To Lug
Unconscious Man Off Tracks, N.Y DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20, 2008, at 3, available at 2008
WLNR 5405314. For an account of Autrey's life after the rescue, see Tina Moore, A Subway
Hero s Year of Living Famously, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 7, 2008, at 20, available at
2008 WLNR 321165.
8. James Barron & Trymaine Lee, 2 More City Heroes, and One Child Saved, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at B 1; Daniel Massey, Catch of Their Lives, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 2007, at
A3.
9. See Barron & Lee, supra note 8.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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is almost certainly the most notorious incident of callousness in the
face of another's mortal peril ever to occur in America. In the very
early hours of March 13, 1964, Catherine "Kitty" Genovese was
stalked, stabbed, brutally attacked again, and eventually killed by
Winston Moseley, a complete stranger to Ms. Genovese.'5 This all
took place on the public streets of Queens over a thirty-five-minute
period during which at least thirty-eight witnesses heard the twenty-
eight-year-old woman desperately scream in fear and for help, but
none of them did anything whatsoever to assist her.'6 It is reported that
one couple turned out the lights in their apartment and pulled chairs up
to the window in order to better observe the drama.'7
Much more recently, in May 2006, David Sharp, a thirty-four-
year-old veteran mountaineer, had just achieved a lifelong ambition to
reach the summit of Mt. Everest when on his way down he
experienced symptoms of severe oxygen deficiency. 8 He managed to
maneuver himself into a shallow snow cave approximately 1000 feet
below the summit adjacent to a well-traveled trail.'9 As Sharp sat
cross-legged in the snow cave struggling for his life, more than forty
climbers, all sufficiently experienced and physically conditioned to
have ascended to 28,000 feet, walked right by him on their way up to
the summit.2 °  Nearly all of them passed without offering any
assistance whatsoever, and none attempted any sort of rescue.' A
15. There are innumerable accounts of this incident in newspapers, magazines,
books, broadcast media, and the academic literature of many disciplines. See, e.g., A.M.
ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES 32-37 (1964); Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder
Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1964, at Al.
16. See sources cited supm note 15.
17. The Night that 38 Stood By as a Life Was Los4 N.Y TtIMES, Mar. 12, 1984, at B1.
One other very highly publicized incident of extreme bystander indifference to the peril of
another is the 1983 sexual assault at Big Dan's Tavern in Massachusetts, the basis of the
Academy Award winning motion picture "The Accused" Lynn S. Chancer, New Bedford
Massachusetts, March 6, 1983-March 22, 1984: The 'Before andAfter" of a Group Rape,
1 GENDER & Soc'Y 239, 244-45 (1987); Thomas Farragher, Widely Watched Mass. Trial
Reshaped Societyl Attitude Toward Rape Victims, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1999, at A1;
Don Terry, Mother Rages Against Indifference, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 24, 1998, at Al0. Another
example of such an incident is the 1997 Memorial Day weekend murder of Sherrice Iverson
in a Nevada casino. SeeAlison M. Arcuri, Comment, Sherrice Iverson Act.: Duty To Report
ChildAbuse and Neglec4 20 PACE L. REv 471, 486-88 (2000).
18. Rod Minchin, Why ILefBrit To Die on Everest BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.), May
24,2006, at 8; Pete Thomas, Morality on a Slippery Slope, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2006, at Al.
19. SeeThomas, supra note 18.
20. Genevieve Roberts, Hillary Condemns Mountaineers Who Left Briton to Die on
Everest, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), May 24, 2006, at 5.
21. Binaj Gurubacharya, Ethics and Everest. Tale of Climber Left To Die Reflects
Changing Dynarmics, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (Cal.), May 27, 2006, at A2 1; Steve
McMorran, Left To Die on Mount Everest: Report That Dozens of Climbers Passed Stricken
[Vol. 82:14471450
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British film crew even shot footage of Sharp as he sat in the snow
cave, talking lucidly, saying, "My name is David Sharp. I am with
Asian Trekking."2 One of the mountaineers who passed by Sharp was
Mark Inglis, the first double-amputee to climb Everest and the
beneficiary of a successful rescue effort that brought him down from
New Zealand's highest mountain, Mt. Cook, twenty-four years earlier."
On May 15, 2006, David Sharp died where he sat, not far from
the frozen remains of an Indian climber who died in 1997 and whose
body Sharp had walked past on his way up to the summit." Sir
Edmund illary, the legendary mountaineer who, with Tenzing
Norgay, reached the summit of Everest for the first time in 1953,
openly criticized the climbers who failed to help Sharp: "It was wrong
if there was a man suffering altitude problems and huddled under a
rock, just to lift your hat, say, 'Good morning' and pass on by .... On
my expedition there was no way you would have left a man under a
rock to die."'  Ed Viesturs, among the strongest and most
accomplished mountain climbers in the world, said, "This isn't the first
time this has happened .... Passing people who are dying is not
uncommon. Unfortunately, there are those who say it's not my
problem. I've spent all this money and I'm going to the summit."
Just a few months before his death, as he was preparing to
embark on the expedition to Everest, David Sharp sought to console
his anxious mother. "'You are never on your own,' he told her. 'There
are climbers everywhere."'2 7
What is the status under American tort law of a failure to reach
out and affirmatively aid another in peril? Could a victim, who suffers
greater harm because no effort was made to help, successfully sue
British Mountaineer on Way to the Summit Shocks First Man To Reach Top, BUFFALO NEWS,
May 25, 2006, at Al; Thomas, supra note 18; 'My Anger at Pal Being Left To Die on
Everes4 'BELFAST TELEGRAPH, May 30,2006, available at2006 WLNR 9246555.
22. Craig Hill, Climbers Condition Disputed- A Web Site Says a Film Company
Shot Footage of a Mount Everest Climber Speaking LucidlyAfter His Fellow Climbers Lei?
Him To Die, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma), June 2, 2006, at A3.
23. Richard Woods, This Man Was LeftAlone To Die by Fellow Climbers on Everest
Has the Once Heroic Sport of Climbing Been Corrupted by Big Money SUNDAY TIMES
(U.K.), May 28, 2006, at 19.
24. 'MyAnger at Pal BeingLefl To Die on Everes' 'supr note 21.
25. Woods, supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Thomas, supra note 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Phinjo Gombu, Ethics an Uphill Climb. British Climber Left To Die on Mt.
Everest Sparks Worldwide Debate, and Bnngs the Death Toll on the Mountain to 11 Already
This Year, TORONTO STAR, May 26, 2006, at A3; Ian Herbert, 'On Everest, You Are Never on
Your Owin ' Words of the Climber Left To Die at Summit INDEPENDENT (U.K.), May 25,
2006, at 18.
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those who chose to do nothing when reasonable, even easy,
opportunities to aid were available? With a few exceptions, the general
rule in American tort law is that bystanders will not be liable to a
victim for their failure to affirmatively aid.2' There is, in other words,
no general duty to reasonably rescue in American law.29
This feature of American tort law differs markedly from the legal
treatment of the same issue in other parts of the world where legal
obligations to affirmatively aid another in peril are common." It
stands also in striking contrast to most conventional views of common
decency and morality.' Perhaps because of this, the no-duty-to-rescue
28. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 338-43 (4th
ed. 1971).
29. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983); Parra v.
Tarasco, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 1186, 1187 (I11. App. Ct. 1992); Fultz v. Union-Commerce Assocs.,
683 N.W2d 587, 591 (Mich. 2004); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810-11 (N.H.
1898); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959); see also Susan Hoffman, Note, Statutes
Establishing a Duty To Report Crines or Render Assistance to Strangers. Making Apathy
Ciminal, 72 KY. L.J. 827, 829 (1984) ("The undisputed general rule under both the criminal
law and tort law is that there is absolutely no duty to rescue a stranger." (footnotes omitted)).
30. See, e~g., Wetboek van Strafrecht [SR] [Criminal Code] art. 450 (Neth.) (Dutch
Penal Code) ("A person who witnesses the immediate mortal danger of another person and
who fails to render or procure such aid and assistance as he is capable of rendering or
procuring where there is no reasonable expectation of danger to himself or others is liable to a
term of detention of not more than three months or a fine of the second category, where the
death of the person in distress ensues."); see also Alberto Cadoppi, Failure To Rescue and the
Continental Ciminal Law, in THE DUTY To RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93, 93
(Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1993) (noting the general rule in
modem Europe of an affirmative duty to rescue); Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good Badand
Ugly. A Comparative Law Analysis, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U L. RE. 77, 79 (2005)
("[A]lmost every civil law jurisdiction in Europe, as well as in Latin America, recognizes
various types of duties to rescue and related tort actions."); Jay Silver, The Duty To Rescue.
A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 423, 424 (1985) ("[T]he duty to
assist an injured or endangered person is commonplace throughout the world...."); Edward
A. Tomlinson, The French Experience with Duty To Rescue. A Dubious Case for Criminal
Enforcement 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 451, 452 (2000) ("Most civil law countries
... recognize a general duty to rescue ... [that] normally results in tort liability.").
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 37 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft 2005) (characterizing the no duty to reasonably rescue proposition as
"morally repugnant"); Michael A. Menlowe, The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty To
Rescue, in THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID, supra note 30, at 5, 5
(recognizing "wide philosophical support for.., a moral requirement to rescue"); PROSSER,
supra note 28, § 56, at 341 (saying of the no duty to rescue cases that "[s]uch decisions are
revolting to any moral sense"); THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS To Do WHAT'S RIGHT 247 (2004) ("Perhaps nothing in the law
reveals such a gross violation of moral failure as the absence of a duty to rescue."); Richard
Russell, Ten Commandments for the Road Echo What Safety Pros Are Preaching, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 29, 2007, at G 12, available at 2007 WLNR 73525176 (reporting on the
Vatican's recent issuance of ten commandments for driving, noting that commandment four
specifies that drivers should "[b]e charitable and help [their] neighbour in need, especially
victims of accidents").
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doctrine has been frequently and widely condemned, with the great
majority of the academic literature on the subject recommending
abandonment or change. 2 And yet, the doctrine remains a standard
part of the common law canon, soon to be recognized again as such by
the Restatement (Third) of Torts."
Why is this the case? This Article sets forth a clear, straightfor-
ward, unapologetic justification for the absence of a duty to reasonably
rescue in American tort law. As immoral, or amoral, as the doctrine
may appear on its face, there exists a complex of arguments that, taken
together, provide a powerful rationale for the rule and its continued
existence. This kind of fully developed argument in support of the
doctrine has not been given much attention in the overwhelmingly
critical treatment that the no-duty-to-rescue rule has received thus far."
32. David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law- An Empirical Perspective on the Duty
To Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REv. 653, 663 n.20 (2006) ("The overwhelming majority of published
articles support the imposition of a generalized duty to assist."); Philip W. Romohr, Note, A
Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical Foundations of the No-Duty-To-
Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1025 (2006) ("[Tlhe absence of a duty to rescue, especially
when such rescue could be accomplished with little or no risk to the rescuer ... has been
criticized by the vast majority of legal scholarship on the subject.").
The list of those who have been critical of the no-duty-to-rescue doctrine is both long
and illustrious. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 293 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789);
PROSSER supra note 28, § 56, at 341; MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY To ACT: TORT LAW,
POWER & PUBLIC POLICY 64-73 (1977); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HAR. L. REv.
97, 111-13 (1908); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case fora Duty To Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 248-
49 (1980). Other powerful critiques of the doctrine include John M. Adler, Relying upon the
Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law
Aftrmative Duties To Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 867, 877-900; Leslie Bender,
A Lawyers Primer on Feminist Theory and Toi 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 33-36 (1988); and
Steven J. Heyman, Foundations ofthe Duty To Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REv. 673, 674-77 (1994).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 37 ("No Duty
of Care with Respect to Risks Not Created by Actor"); see also Peter F Lake, Recognizing
the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty To Rescue, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 316 (1997)
("In the face of continuous academic attacks, one body of tort law has survived this century,
at least superficially, intact-the duty (or lack thereof) to rescue." (footnotes omitted)).
34. A convincing justification is still apparently lacking in the literature judging from
the reaction that has been expressed by many scholars. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Duty To Rescue in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 647, 678-79 (2002) ("That is the
argument in favor of a duty to rescue from physical peril. It is extremely strong. Several
kinds of arguments have been made against such a duty. They are not very strong-certainly,
not strong enough to trump the argument in favor of such a duty.").
35. The literature does include some defenses of the no-duty-to-rescue rule, often
focusing on one or another particular explanatory rationale. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 197-204 (1973) (focusing on individual
freedom and an economic analysis); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 901, 928-43 (1982) (focusing on procedural aspects); Saul Levmore,
Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of
Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879, 938 (1986) (focusing on the problem of multiple
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Notwithstanding, it offers an understanding of the practical value of
the rule that must be dealt with by any future attempt to overturn or
alter its status.
Following this introduction, Part II of this Article sets forth the
basic tort law doctrine of negligence, including the general absence of
a duty to reasonably rescue and its standard exceptions. Part II
carefully places the doctrine in the larger context of the negligence
cause of action in which it functionally resides. This is important
because a full understanding of the no-duty-to-rescue doctrine begins
with an appreciation that it is less an affirmative assertion of preferred
behavior and outcomes than a tenet of tort law not to extend the usual
regulatory pressures of negligence into this particular nook of human
judgment.
Part III of this Article advances a justification for the no-duty-to-
rescue rule. The analysis adopts a practical perspective, comparing the
likely costs and benefits of the no-duty-to-rescue doctrine with those
of its alternative, a general tort law obligation to engage in reasonable
rescue efforts on behalf of a stranger. The probable consequences of
the two competing rules are evaluated from the point of view of
potential victims who may need assistance from others, of those who
might provide such aid, and of society at large. From all three
viewpoints, this Part demonstrates that a general duty to affirmatively
aid in tort law would generate far more costs than it would provide
corresponding benefits.
Part IV of this Article considers whether a limited duty to rescue
should be adopted for those individuals who possess some special
training or experience in the furnishing of such aid. While the analysis
with respect to specially trained individuals is different in some
respects than for individuals without such training, these differences do
not justify the imposition upon them of a special duty to rescue.
Nevertheless, because specially trained and experienced individuals
offer the promise of the highest quality rescue efforts, and thus the
optimum number of successful outcomes, it is unsatisfying to have the
legal treatment of such individuals remain the same as it is for
untrained and inexperienced persons. It is in this context that the
operation and function of Good Samaritan statutes are considered.
If it should become necessary to adopt some form of formal legal
duty to reasonably rescue, would it be preferable to adopt it as a tort
potential rescuers); Romohr, supm note 32, at 1042-46 (focusing on personal autonomy and
individual rights).
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law duty or as a criminal law duty? Part V analyzes this question and
argues for the comparative superiority of a criminal law duty but not
for the ultimate desirability of such a statute. The primary advantage
that a criminal law duty would have over a tort law duty is the presence
of prosecutorial discretion. Such discretion permits social control of
the pursuit of liability for a failure to rescue in a way not available with
a tort cause of action. This Part goes on to demonstrate how some of
the costs associated with a tort law duty to rescue could be avoided by
a criminal law duty. Part VI concludes the Article.
II. No DUTY To RESCUE AS A NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE
The no-duty-to-rescue doctrine covers behavior, or the absence
thereof, that occupies a modest subset of the wide range of behavior
that comes under the purview of negligence law. It is, fundamentally,
an exception to the normal operation of the negligence cause of action.
As such, it is important to approach an understanding of the no-duty-
to-rescue doctrine within the broader framework of negligence law.
A. The Context ofNegligence
Under the law of negligence, there exists a nearly pervasive duty
to act with at least reasonable care regarding other persons and their
property." If this duty is breached, and the breaching behavior was the
actual and proximate cause of cognizable harm to another, then the
breaching party is generally liable to the person who brings an action
for the tort of negligence. 7
36. See Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (Brett, M.R.) ("[W]henever one
person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of
ordinary sense who did think would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and
skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury
to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger."). The notion of duty in negligence as being more or less pervasive relies upon the
requirement of proximate cause, rather than the requirement of the existence of a legal duty,
to limit the defendant's liability to those situations in which the breach of the duty causes
reasonably foreseeable harm to a reasonably foreseeable person. This is the Andrews
approach to the duty and proximate cause elements of negligence as articulated in the famous
case of Palsgraf v Long IslandRailroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
37. W PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAvtD G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ,
KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID E PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTz'S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 132 (11 th ed. 2005).
2008] 1455
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On the whole, most any behavior that can give rise to harm can
come under the second-guessing purview of negligence law.38 The
obvious foolishness of driving a car while intoxicated is a possible
trigger for negligence liability, as is a delicate and subtle error in the
administration of anesthesia during surgery or a difficult and
complicated part of the surgical procedure itself." Negligence law is
famously immodest, willing to evaluate and judge the reasonableness
of most any harm-producing behavior that is alleged to have caused an
injury, no matter how much specialized training, experience, and talent
is generally required to engage in that behavior."°
Often, the reasonableness of a given behavior is determined by
reference to what most persons would do if facing circumstances
similar to those faced by the defendant in the negligence action."
Would most railroad companies place broad gauge trailers onto narrow
gauge trucks? 2 Would most ophthalmologists administer a glaucoma
test to a patient presenting glaucoma-like symptoms who was under
the age of fortyT3 Would most landlords rent an apartment with plain
glass installed in a bathtub enclosure door?"
This important element in determining the reasonableness of a
given behavior is typically called the custom factor or the industry
standard. 5 Use of a prevailing custom or an industry standard as a
surrogate measure for reasonableness encourages persons to become
aware of such customs or standards and to at least meet them when
38. KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, supra note 37, § 33, at 193 ("The application
of this standard of reasonable conduct is as wide as all human behavior. There is scarcely any
act which, under some conceivable circumstances, may not involve an unreasonable risk of
harm.").
39. See, e.g., Crockett v. United States, 116 F.2d 646, 649-51 (4th Cir. 1940); Tolliver
v. United States, 831 E Supp. 558, 559-60 (S.D. W Va. 1993); Todd v. United States, 570 F
Supp. 670, 672-75 (D.S.C. 1983).
40. See Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprott
Directors 103 COLUM. L. RE. 925, 954 (2003) ("Lawyers, doctors, accountants, and all
other professionals are subject to ordinary negligence review, and courts have never
questioned their ability to second-guess decisions after the fact." (footnote omitted)).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965); KEETON, DOBBS,
KEETON & OWEN, supra note 37, § 33, at 193-94 ("If the actor does only what everyone else
has done, there is at least an inference that the actor is conforming to the community's idea of
reasonable behavior.").
42. Titus v. Bradford, Bordell & Kinzua R.R. Co., 20 A. 517, 517-18 (Pa. 1890).
43. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 981-83 (Wash. 1974).
44. Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 503-05 (N.Y 1982).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A.
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engaging in potentially harm producing behavior." It establishes an
aspirational minimum of reasonable care for potentially dangerous
activities in society.7  Thus, in medical malpractice actions, the
defendant physician's actions are typically compared to those of a
hypothetical reasonably prudent physician, and the jury is permitted to
assume that the actions taken by most physicians under similar
circumstances is an appropriate measure of the actions of the
reasonably prudent physician.48
In some cases, there may not exist a prevailing custom or an
industry standard that usefully applies to the defendant's harm-
producing behavior.49 In other cases, the plaintiff may wish to
challenge the industry standard itself as being unreasonably careless."
In both of these circumstances, the reasonableness of the behavior
under review is usually analyzed by means of what is commonly called
the Learned Hand Formula." The Learned Hand Formula is
essentially a cost-benefit approach to reasonable care that compares
the cost of the precaution necessary to avoid the harm caused by the
defendant to the cost of the harm discounted by the probability that the
precaution, if taken, would have in fact prevented the harm from
occurring.52
Persons subject to negligence law are thus encouraged to take
cost-effective precautions to avoid causing harm to others in order to
avoid potential liability for themselves. 3 The reasonable person will
46. See id. (finding that custom is the collective judgment of what precautions should
be taken to avoid risks and that it creates a justifiable expectation that others will do what is
usual to prevent negligence).
47. See Zacher v. Budd Co., 396 N.W2d 122, 133 (S.D. 1986) ("[Ilndustry standards
are merely a minimal standard that may be considered... ").
48. See Cleary v. Group Health Assoc., Inc., 691 A.2d 148, 152, 156 (D.C. 1997).
See generally Eric M. Levine, A New Predicament for Physicians: The Concept of Medical
Futility the Physician s Obligation To Render Inappropriate Treatment, and the Interplay of
the Medical Standard of Care, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 69, 101 (1994) (noting that a general
consensus among doctors sets a standard of care).
49. The TJ. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740, 1932 AMC 1169, 1175 (2d
Cir. 1932) (finding no established custom for receiving sets).
50. Id.; Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974). See generally Richard A.
Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of TolZ
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1992) (arguing that custom should provide the basis for
determining the negligence standard of care).
51. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 E2d 1554, 1556-57 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 E2d 169, 173, 1947 AMC 35, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1947).
52. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Plovidba, 683 E2d 1022, 1026-29, 1983 AMC 2473,
2477-82 (7th Cir. 1982); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85-88 (1987).
53. See Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 75 TEX. L.
REv. 1605, 1612 (1997) ("For those who create risks of harm that may be suffered by others,
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act to reduce the risk of injuring another whenever the precaution to be
taken is less costly than the risk of loss it eliminates.' When it
operates properly, negligence law holds liable those persons who fail to
take cost-effective precautions and as a result cause harm to others."
Negligence law is, in a sense, a massive formal system of second-
guessing, of Monday-morning quarterbacking, with the defendant's
assets held in the balance. 6  One of its striking features is its
fearlessness, some might say its hubris, in the breadth of human
activities it is prepared to formally second-guess. Though aided by
(often conflicting) expert testimony, negligence law essentially
involves only three attorneys (judge included) and a dozen or fewer
members of the public looking back and second-guessing the
reasonableness of most any human activity that can cause harm to
another.57 Through the cause of action of negligence, society
collectively passes judgment on the adequacy of the work of a cardiac
surgeon who has successfully completed decades of formal education,
apprenticeship, and training and who may have the benefit of
additional decades of clinical experience. 8 The public will also,
without hesitation, judge her similarly educated, trained, and
experienced colleagues in neurology, anesthesiology, pulmonology,
the risk-benefit standard for negligence provides incentives to take precautions to avoid or
minimize risks that can be avoided more cheaply than the cost of the precautions."); Douglas
Litowitz, A Citical Take on Shasta County and the 'New Chicago School," 15 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 295, 300 (2003) ("Under traditional legal analysis ... the law of negligence places
responsibility for the damage on one of the two parties, thereby motivating that person to take
precautions in order to avoid liability.").
54. See Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable
Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosio 82 Nw U. L. REV. 293, 303 (1988) ("Of
course, it is quite permissible for the reasonable person to omit precaution that is not cost-
justified....").
55. See McCarty, 826 F.2d at 1557 ("Unreasonable conduct is merely the failure to
take precautions that would generate greater benefits in avoiding accidents than the
precautions would cost."); Mark E Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence,
92 YALE L.J. 799, 801 (1983) (noting that negligence law determines when people have failed
to take enough precautions through its breach of duty element).
56. See Robert Heidt, TheAvid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-Protection: When
Exculpatory Clauses Should Be Enforced, 38 U. RiCH. L. REV. 381, 395 (2004) ("This
modem meaning of negligence encourages relentless second-guessing."); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsigh 65 U. CHi. L. REv. 571,
591 (1998) (discussing the hindsight bias inherent in negligence law).
57. See Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 572.
58. See, e.g., McQueen v. Jersani, 909 So. 2d 491, 492-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005);
Vargas v. Dulzaides, 520 So. 2d 306, 306-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Turcsik v. Guthrie
Clinic, Ltd., 784 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722-23 (App. Div. 2004).
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and every other medical specialty, no matter how complex or arcane."
Similarly, society stands ready to review and pass judgment on the
highly technical and often subtle judgments and specialized work of
architects, accountants, engineers, and professionals of every stripe."
B. The No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule
In the midst of this more or less pervasive obligation of
reasonable precaution and care generated by the operation of
negligence law, there exists a black hole, a small void in which the
duty of reasonable care does not apply. Is this exceptional absence of
the otherwise omnipresent duty to act reasonably with regard to the
safety of others reserved for some activity that is thought to be too
technical and complex for fair assessment by laymen and lawyers?
Does it represent a human judgment too fraught with moral ambiguity
to be reasonably second-guessed? Hardly.
It is a long-established feature of American tort law that a person
owes no legal duty to affirmatively act to aid a stranger in peril, no
matter how reasonable a readily available affirmative act might be."
59. See, e.g., Ascher v. Gutierrez, 533 F2d 1235, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(anesthesiology); Dickey v. Daughety, 917 P.2d 889, 890 (Kan. 1996) (pulmonology);
Betscher v. Univ. of Cincinnati Hosp., 115 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 13-14 (Ct. Cl. 2000)
(neurology).
60. See, e.g., Mayor of Columbus, Miss. v. Clark-Dietz & Assocs.-Eng'rs, Inc., 550 E
Supp. 610, 612 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (architect-engineer); Emond v. Tyler Bldg. & Constr. Co.,
438 So. 2d 681, 683-84 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (engineer); Collins v. Esserman & Pelter, 681
N.Y.S.2d 399, 400-01 (App. Div. 1998) (accountant); see also KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON &
OWEN, supra note 37, § 32, at 185-86 (noting that professionals of all types must exercise
reasonable care and possess a standard minimum level of knowledge and ability).
61. See Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219, 220, 1951 AMC 1657, 1659 (D.
Mass. 1951) ("It is well settled common law that a mere bystander incurs no liability where
he fails to take any action, however negligently or even intentionally, to rescue another in
distress."); Williams v. California, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) ("As a rule, one has no duty
to come to the aid of another. A person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely
for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another...."); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Cappier, 72 P 281, 283 (Kan. 1903) ("The moral law would obligate an attempt to rescue a
person in a perilous position-as a drowning child-but the law of the land does not require
it, no matter how little personal risk it might involve...."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (noting that knowledge that action is required to aid another does not
create a duty to render aid); sources cited supm note 29 (reviewing in case law and
scholarship the lack of a duty to rescue).
However, there are three states that have enacted some form of statutory duty to rescue:
Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2000) ("A
person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has
suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or
peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person."); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-56-1 (2002) ("Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person
is exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or she can do so
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Thus, if I am standing by my car in a fairly steeply sloped parking lot
of a shopping center, and I see a heavy metal shopping cart,
completely unattended, rolling towards a small and oblivious group of
people conversing together some yards downhill, I need not do so
much as shout a simple warning in order to avoid subsequent liability
for negligence when the cart hits and badly injures some of them.
The overwhelming majority of people in a similar position would
have at least called out a warning. A shouted warning would have
been nearly free of cost to me and would almost certainly have saved
the victims from significant physical injury. Under no recognized
approach to determining the reasonableness of a person's judgment
would not calling out a warning be deemed acceptable. 2 And yet, in
most every jurisdiction in this country, I would face no exposure to
negligence law liability for my complete failure to act reasonably in
this instance, for in American tort law, I have no legal duty to
reasonably act toward a stranger in peril-no duty to affirmatively
aid.63
There are three basic exceptions to the general no-duty-to-rescue
rule that are recognized in a majority of American jurisdictions.' One
covers situations in which a particular relationship exists between the
without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002) ("A person who knows that another
is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without
danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by
others."); see also Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue. A ComMent 25 STAN. L.
REv. 51, 55-61 (1972) (discussing the Vermont statute).
A statutory duty to affirmatively aid, rare as it is in America, was given national
exposure when it was featured in the plot of the series finale of the television show
"Seinfeld." Seinfeld: The Finale (NBC television broadcast May 14, 1998) (transcript
available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheFinale.htm). Even more rare, indeed
apparently nonexistent, is an actual prosecution of a violation of one of these statutes. See
Hyman, supra note 32, at 657 & n.7 ("[A]fter a combined total of almost eighty years of
experience in three states, there have been no prosecutions for non-rescue....").
62. See Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required
Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605, 625 (2001) ("[A]II agree that the person who fails to effect an easy
rescue is a moral monster ... ").
63. See Weinrib, supra note 32, at 247 ("No observer would have any difficulty
outlining the current state of the law throughout the common-law world regarding the duty to
rescue. Except when the person endangered and the potential rescuer are linked in a special
relationship, there is no such duty.").
64. Various commentators have suggested the existence of more than three
exceptions to the general rule, though the three described here are all consensus choices that
occupy the core of the exceptions. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 654 (arguing that
American contract law imposes a duty on contracting parties to act affirmatively to protect
each other from significant loss).
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plaintiff and the defendant.65  The two relationships most commonly
held to fall within this exception are the businessperson-customer
relationship and the employer-employee relationship."6 Thus, if a sales
associate working in a department store observes a customer on the
sales floor kneel over in apparent pain and fall to the ground, the clerk,
representing the department store, could not fail to take any action on
behalf of the stricken customer without having that decision potentially
second-guessed in a subsequent negligence suit.67 Similarly, if the
sales associate were experiencing medical distress and the manager of
the department were observing the scene, the manager would not be
protected by the no-duty-to-rescue rule from subsequent negligence
liability for a failure to act.6
A second well-recognized exception to the general rule applies to
circumstances in which the defendant was a cause of the peril faced by
the plaintiff.69 Thus, if the plaintiff's and the defendant's cars collide,
and the plaintiff is knocked unconscious, slumped in his driver's seat,
while the defendant remains alert and capable, the defendant will owe
to the plaintiff a legal duty to take reasonable measures on the
plaintiff's behalf."
A third exception to the general no-duty-to-rescue rule is
triggered by the defendant voluntarily rendering aid to the plaintiff."
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. a.
66. Id. § 314A(3) (businessperson-customer); id § 314B (employer-employee).
67. See Lundy v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 34 E3d 1173, 1200-02 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker,
J., concurring in part of the judgment and dissenting in part) (surveying cases from a variety
of jurisdictions dealing with the duty of a business to a customer who suffers a heart attack);
see also L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337-38 (Ind. 1942) (finding that a
businessperson had a duty to rescue a customer who had caught his fingers in an elevator).
68. See, e.g., Harris v. Pa. R.R. Co., 50 E2d 866, 868-69, 1931 AMC 1303, 1308-09
(4th Cir. 1931) (finding that a shipmaster must make reasonable efforts to rescue a seaman
who fell overboard).
69. Hardy v. Brooks, 118 S.E.2d 492, 495-96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that a
driver who hit and killed a cow had a duty of reasonable care to protect other drivers on the
road blocked by the carcass); Parrish v. Atd. Coast Line R.R. Co., 20 S.E.2d 299, 304-05
(N.C. 1942) (holding that a railroad must take reasonable precautions to protect travelers from
obstructions on railroad crossing caused nonnegligently by the railroad); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 322; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 316, at 856 (2000) ("The
defendant who knows or should know that he has caused physical harm to the plaintiff, even
if caused without fault, owes a duty of reasonable care to avoid further harm.").
70. Brumfield v. Wofford, 102 S.E.2d 103, 104-05 (W Va. 1958) (noting that
violating a criminal "hit and run" statute is prima facie evidence of a driver's negligence).
71. Marsalis v. La Salle, 94 So. 2d 120, 126 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (holding a cat owner
liable for failure to keep her promise to help the plaintiffs keep her cat indoors until rabies
status could be established after the cat bit the plaintiff); Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc.,
161 A.2d 479, 482, 487-88 (N.J. 1960) (holding an employer liable when a coworker
promised the victim's wife that he would call a doctor and failed to do so); Zelenko v. Gimbel
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Suppose the defendant sees the plaintiff, a stranger, fall to the sidewalk
of a public street and lapse into unconsciousness. A small crowd of
onlookers gathers around the plaintiff. The defendant says out loud,
"I'll go for help," and begins to walk briskly down the street. After
turning a comer and moving out of sight of the crowd, the defendant
abandons his plan to seek help and instead walks home. In such
circumstances, the plaintiff may, through a negligence claim, formally
question the reasonableness of the defendant's failure to do more on
his behalf.72
Despite the existence of these three traditional exceptions, the
general no-duty-to-rescue rule remains robust, covering a large
number of possible circumstances in which a person's condition may
be seriously worsened by another's failure to reasonably help. 3 Why
would a regime of negligence law that is willing to scrutinize for
reasonableness all manner of human judgments be unwilling to do its
usual work in even the most obvious of cases? Why not impose upon
each of us an obligation to act with at least reasonable care when
confronted with another in peril? Why, in the earlier example, impose
an obligation to drive to the shopping center with reasonable care, to
park with reasonable care, to shop with reasonable care, and to depart
with reasonable care, but fail to impose upon me any obligation at all
to reasonably call out a warning to the people threatened by the
runaway shopping cart?
Bros., Inc., 287 N.YS. 134, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ("U]f a defendant undertakes a task, even if
under no duty to undertake it, the defendant must not omit to do what an ordinary man would
do in performing the task."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323; see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILrY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42 reporters note (Proposed Final Draft
2005) ("Nearly every jurisdiction has endorsed and applied § 323 or accepted a similar
principle.").
72. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 E2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[I]f you do
begin to rescue someone you must complete the rescue in a nonnegligent fashion even though
you had no duty of rescue in the first place."); Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W2d 217, 220 (Mich.
1976) ("'Where performance clearly has been begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of
care."' (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 346 (4th ed. 1971))).
73. One circumstance that has attracted calls for the creation of an additional
exception to the traditional no-duty-to-rescue rule is the family relationship. PROSSER, supm"
note 28, § 56, at 342; Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty ofParents To
Protect Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REv 311, 320-22 (2006). Despite this pressure, there is
virtually no significant case law support for such an exception and the Restatement (Third) of
Torts explicitly refuses to recognize it. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 40 cmt. o.
The analysis offered in this Article does not support such an exception, primarily
because the level of uncoerced compliance among family members is most likely so sky high
that almost any set of moderate costs associated with the adoption of such an affirmative duty
would swamp the expected practical benefits.
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Surely no satisfying explanation of this feature of tort law resides
in the degree to which it gives expression to conventional morality or
ethics.74 The overwhelming majority of us, if asked, would certainly
say that the proper, socially acceptable response to a stranger in
physical peril is to offer at least reasonable aid." No serious religion or
secular system of ethics recommends that its adherents fail to aid
another in peril when a reasonable response is available.76 In fact, a
person who fails to act in such a situation could rightly be condemned
for such a decision, and every now and then celebrated cases of this
sort receive their share of national attention.77
III. RATIONALES SUPPORTING THE No-DuTY-To-REscuE RULE
How, then, can tort law possibly justify the continued presence of
this no-duty-to-rescue rule? The answer lies within a collection of
approximately half a dozen basic arguments, some of which carry
more weight in the overall scheme than others.
74. See Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185, 1189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989),
revU 634 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) ("An enlightened society should no
longer excuse the immoral and outrageous conduct of a person who allows another to drown,
simply because he doesn't wish to get his feet wet.").
75. See Antony M. Honor&, Law, Morals andRescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND
THE LAW 225, 231 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) ("'[I]f [rescue] efforts should be omitted by
anyone when they could be made without imperilling his own life, he would, by his conduct,
draw upon himself the censure and reproach of good men."' (quoting United States v.
Knowles, 26 E Cas. 800, 801 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 15,540))); Christopher H. white,
Comment, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Case for Reform of the Rescue Doctine,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 507, 513 (2002) ("These [duty to rescue] laws acknowledge the belief that
the common-law no-duty-to-rescue rule is inconsistent with modem social goals. Few would
dispute the argument that a society in which people assist their fellow citizens in times of
need is superior to one in which they callously ignore the cries for help of others." (footnote
omitted)).
76. See Romohr, supra note 32, at 1027 ("[Mlost, if not all, of these theories [of
political and moral philosophy] support some form of a duty to rescue."); see also Steven H.
Resnicoff, Supplying Human Body Parts.- A Jewish Law Pespective, 55 DEPAuLL. RE. 851,
853 (2006) ("Unlike common law, Jewish law imposes an affirmative duty to save a person's
life through one's direct intervention or through the use of one's resources"); Schiff, supra
note 30, at 81 ("Plato's Laws had a bad Samaritan statute .... Christian Europe was not deaf
to Christ's parable [of the Good Samaritan]: both St. Augustine and St. Thomas recognized
the moral obligation to help another in need." (footnote omitted)); Peter Singer, Famine,
Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972) ("[I]f it is in our power to
prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.").
77. See Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and PatriotActs Rights and Duties in the
Worst of Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 242, 248-49 (2006) (discussing several
"horrific headline cases"); Hyman, supra note 32, at 655 ("When a case of non-rescue
becomes public, newspaper editorials and television commentators will denounce the
indifference of bystanders. If the non-rescuers can be identified, they will be held up to
public scorn."); supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
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A. The Potential for Only Modest Benefits
1. Uncoerced Compliance
The rationale for the rule begins, interestingly enough, with the
same conventional moral wisdom that makes the rule seem so
counterintuitive. Namely, that it is an uncontroversial element of
generally accepted societal behavior that one should act reasonably to
help another facing serious peril, that every individual should at least
call out for help, if while walking in the mall he comes across a person
lying on the floor, bleeding, and crying out in pain."8 So unquestioned
is this simple behavioral norm that it is fair to assume that the great
majority of people who find themselves in such a situation will in fact
call out for help, or otherwise act reasonably, to aid the stranger on the
floor.79
Thus, it should be acknowledged that a no-duty-to-rescue rule,
that is, a rule that threatens negligence liability for a defendant failing
to reasonably assist a stranger in peril would generate only a small
number of additional rescue efforts than currently exist under the no-
duty rule." Because the underlying behavioral norm is so strong and
uncontroversial, there can be said to already exist a very high level of
uncoerced compliance with the desired behavioral goal.' In other
words, society already enjoys very high levels of reasonable
affirmative responses to others in peril even in the absence of a
coercive legal rule."
78. See Hyman, supra note 32, at 656-57 (noting the incredible frequency of rescue,
calling Americans "too willing" to rescue).
79. See id. at 654 ("[I]n the real world, rescue is the rule--even if it is not the law.").
In his article, Professor Hyman makes a heroic effort to quantify rescue behavior relevant to
the traditional no-duty-to-rescue rule. Id. at 669-82. In addition to making some fascinating
findings, Professor Hyman demonstrates overwhelmingly how difficult, if not outright
impossible, it currently is to obtain hard measurements of these behaviors. Id at 693.
Professor Hyman himself concludes, "The results presented in this article do not allow one to
reach firm conclusions as to the actual frequency of rescue and non-rescue in the United
States because there is insufficient evidence that the studied sample of rescuers and non-
rescuers is representative of the general population." Id.
80. See id. at 665 ("[Confirmable instances of non-rescue are actually extraordi-
narily rare events, occurring about 1.6 times per year in the entire United States during the
past decade.").
81. See id. at 668 ("[C]onfirmed rescues outnumber non-rescues by approximately
740:1."); White, supra note 75, at 508 ("People, for moral or other reasons, often spring into
action when they see their fellow citizens in danger.").
82. See Mary Ann Glendon, Looking for "'Persons"in the Law, FIRST THINGS, Dec.
2006, at 19, 22 ("[A]ctual cases of failure to rescue rarely arise."); Hyman, supm note 32, at
706 ("[C]onsiderable evidence indicates that the real problem is that Americans are too
willing to rescue in risky circumstances.").
[Vol. 82:14471464
DUTY TO REASONABL YRESCUE
In this sense, one can look at a duty-to-rescue rule as being a bit
like an affirmative legal requirement that parents care for the basic
physical needs of their newborn children. No one questions the
importance of parents caring for their infant children or the significant
social cost that would result if parents failed to do so, but the clear
tendency of the overwhelming number of parents to care for their
newborns, and to do so even in the absence of a formal legal rule
requiring them to, strongly suggests that the existence of such a rule
would have little practical effect on overall parenting behavior.83 It is of
little surprise, therefore, that over time the American legal system has
not developed a vigorous jurisprudence in this area."
In contrast, there are some behaviors deemed by society as useful
and important for individuals to undertake, but in the absence of a
coercive legal rule, many citizens are unwilling to undertake them.
This may be the case even in the face of widespread consensus that the
individual behavior is valuable or even necessary. One example of
such a behavior is the payment of taxes to finance the operation of
government. In the absence of a coercive legal rule and aggressive
enforcement, one would expect a fairly low level of purely voluntary
compliance with this behavioral norm, even among those who would
acknowledge the validity of the norm itself.85 Hence, we see the
maintenance of a very vigorous jurisprudence in this area of the law.8"
83. The National Center for Health Statistics reports that there were 4,066,000 live
births in the United States in the twelve months ending September 2003. Paul D. Sutton &
Martha L. Munson, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for
September 2003, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Feb. 13, 2004, at 1, 1, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_16.pdf. There were 89,970 victims of child maltreatment under the
age of one year in 2004. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2004, tbl. 3-10 (2004), http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm04/
table3_10.htm. These numbers project that slightly more than two percent of all infants under
the age of one year were the victims of child maltreatment in 2004. While this number of
infant victims is deplorably high, it does indicate that the overwhelming percentage of parents
in the United States adequately care for their newborn babies.
84. In fact, the vast majority of jurisdictions recognize, or recognized, a general
parent-child immunity. See, e.g., Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891)
(adopting the first formulation of parent-child immunity, which was subsequently overruled
in Glaskox exrel. Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992)).
85. SeegenerallyBelli v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1172, 1181 (1989) ("Expressing
one's feelings about the IRS. .. is not an element of tax fraud; if it were, our Federal prisons
undoubtedly would be brimming with such 'tax convicts.' We fail to discern any requirement
that taxpayers must enjoy or look forward to paying their taxes."); Danshera Cords, Tax
Protestors and Penalties." Ensuring Perceived Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005
BYU L. REV. 1515, 1522 ("Notwithstanding the popular maxim that 'taxes are what we pay
for a civilized society,' most people would rather not give money to the government."
(footnote omitted)); Kenneth H. Ryesky, Taxation Unchecked and Unbalanced: The Supreme
Courts Denial of Certiorari n Sorrentino, 41 GONZ. L. REv. 505, 536 (2006) ("[N]o taxpayer
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If one accepts that reasonably responding to another in peril is
more like parents caring for their newborn than like paying taxes, one
can then conclude that the practical benefit of switching from a no-
duty-to-rescue rule to an affirmative duty-to-rescue rule would be
quite modest. This is especially true as technological advances, like
mobile telephones, often make a reasonable effort to aid another in
peril easy and virtually risk free. Because the vast majority of persons
subject to the rule are already thought to be engaging in the desired
behavior, only the actions of the uncommon few who refuse to
conform to the prevailing societal norm are subject to change.
Whatever the cost of this candle, we can say with some confidence
that the light that it will produce will be rather dim.
2. Reluctant Rescuers
Few overall changes in behavior are likely to result from the
adoption of an affirmative duty to rescue. The assertion that high
levels of uncoerced reasonable rescue efforts currently exist also
allows the behavioral analysis to focus usefully on the predicted
actions and reactions of those who would only engage in reasonable
rescue efforts in the presence of a coercive legal requirement.
The situation is much like the recurring discussion among law
school faculties about which courses in the curriculum should be
required of all students prior to graduation." Take, for example, a
course like corporation law. There are very interesting arguments, in
the abstract, for the value of corporation law as a subject of study and
as a necessary or desirable body of predicate knowledge prior to
is expected to have amorous feelings towards paying taxes, or towards the agencies that
collect the revenue... ").
86. See, e.g., 2007-8 I.R.B. 523 (containing eighty-eight pages of summaries of the
Internal Revenue Service substantive rulings, comments, and explanations over a one-week
period).
87. This is a faculty discussion that I have observed and in which I have participated
in at no fewer than five different law schools over some twenty years. For references to the
identification and modification of law school required courses in the literature, see Russell
Engler, From 10 to 20." A Guide To Utilizing the MacCrate Report over the Next Decade, 23
PACE L. REv. 519, 556 (2003); Keith A. Findley, Re&scovering the Lawyer School:
Cunculum Reform in Wisconsin, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 295, 326-28 (2006); Peter K. Rofes,
Mandatory Obsolescence. The Thirty Cre&t Rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court 82
MARQ. L. REV. 787, 791-93 (1999). SeegenerallyRena I. Steinzor & Alan D. Hornstein, The
Unplanned Obsolescence ofAmerican LegalEducation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 447,447-51 (2002)
(advocating for continuous monitoring and reform of law school curricula); John C. Weistart,
The Law School Curriculum: The Process of Reform, 1987 DUKE L.J. 317, 318-29
(discussing the history and variety of curricular reform proposals at American law schools).
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practicing law in the modem world." In an important sense, however,
these arguments are somewhat beside the point. The overwhelming
majority of students do in fact take a course in corporation law and in
other foundational subjects like constitutional law, evidence law, and
commercial law before they graduate, even if not formally required."
Thus, the more relevant inquiry is less whether such courses are
generally valuable or invaluable, but why the small minority of
students who choose not to take the course prior to graduation make
that decision.
If I were to discover that most of the students who choose not to
take corporation law do so because they were undergraduate business
majors, held advanced degrees in business management or accounting,
or were otherwise exposed to basic corporate law through experience
in the securities industry or elsewhere and thus wished to spend their
credit hours on a subject with which they were less familiar, I would
feel one way about making corporation law a graduation requirement.
On the other hand, if I came to believe that most of these students
avoided the corporation law course out of a generalized distaste for
business matters and the fear of having to work with numbers and
finance, I would feel quite differently.
Similarly, in predicting the differences in behavior when society
applies a no-duty-to-rescue versus an affirmative duty-to-rescue rule,
the most useful analysis focuses only on the likely behavior of persons
who would behave differently under the two competing rules, i.e.,
those who would only attempt to rescue because of an affirmative,
coercive legal requirement to do so. These persons can be called, for
convenience, reluctant rescuers. When thinking about reluctant
rescuers, it should be acknowledged that not all persons who would
choose not to reasonably aid another in the absence of a coercive legal
rule would necessarily respond by engaging in the socially desired
behavior when faced with the threat of tort law liability. After all,
much more severe consequences now exist for those found guilty of
88. See Therese Maynard, Teaching Professionalism: The Lawyer as a Professional,
34 GA. L. RE. 895, 923 (2000); Charles R.T. O'Kelley, Foreword. The Many Passions of
Teaching Corporations, 34 GA. L. REv. 423, 424 (2000); Robert W Gordon, Bargaining with
the Devil, 105 HARv. L. REv. 2041, 2059 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG,
BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1992)).
89. See J. Peter Byme, Academic Freedom and Political Neutality in Law Schools:
An Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Educatio, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 333
(1993); Kyle Graham, The Refugee Jurist andAmerican Law Schools, 1933-1941, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 777, 784 n.35 (2002); Joan Mahoney, The Future ofLegal Education, 33 U. TOL. L.
REv. 113, 114 (2001).
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homicide, armed robbery, and other serious crimes, and yet people
continue to commit those crimes."
Moreover, situations in which a person comes across an
opportunity to reasonably aid another in peril and chooses not to do so
rarely present an easy opportunity for the victim to identify the
potential defendant and subsequently bring suit." If the driver of the
first car standing at the light of an intersection at which a severe
collision has just occurred fails to pick up his mobile phone and call
for emergency services, who among the potential plaintiffs is likely to
ever know? What are the chances of detection and civil prosecution
when someone passively watches a shopping cart strike its victims in
the parking lot? Thus, the often undetectable nature of possible
defendants diminishes further the practical effect of an affirmative
duty-to-rescue rule.
Of course, the likelihood of identification as someone who failed
to reasonably aid another in peril increases dramatically if there are
bystanders other than the victim physically present." Consequently,
one might expect those who would otherwise fail to render aid to be
more likely to do so when there are other persons present. The relative
importance of requiring a reluctant rescuer to act, however, decreases
as the number of other people present on the scene and available to
render aid to the victim increases. Therefore, it is likely that an
affirmative duty to rescue will produce a greater number of additional
rescue efforts in just those circumstances in which additional coerced
rescue efforts are least needed.
90. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintains statistics on crimes in the
United States through its Uniform Crime Reporting Program. FBI, Uniform Crime Reports,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). For example, an estimated
16,692 persons were murdered nationwide in 2005. FBI, Crime in the United States 2005:
Murder, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/violent-crime/murderhomicide.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2008). There were an estimated 417,122 robbery offenses and 862,947
aggravated assaults during that same year. FBI, Crime in the United States 2005: Robbery,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/violent-crime/robbery.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2008); FBI, Crime in the United States 2005: Aggravated Assault, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
05cius/offenses/violentcrime/aggravated.assault.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
91. See Alon Harel & Assaf Jacob, An Economic Rationale for the Legal Treatment
of Omissions in Tort Law: The Principle of Salience, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 413, 428-
30 (2002); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in
Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 433, 510 & n.360 (1995); Larry C. Wilson,
The Defence of Others-Criminal Law and the Good Samaritan, 33 McGILL L.J. 756, 811-
12 (1988).
92. See Hyman, supra note 32, at 700 ("[T]he likelihood of rescue [is] significantly
affected by the number of witnesses....").
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In summary, the practical benefits of an affirmative duty to
reasonably rescue in tort law would be quite meager, both because the
existing level of uncoerced compliance is quite high and because the
percentage of noncompliers likely to change their behavior because of
a coercive rule will be small."
B. The Likely Costs ofa Coercive Rule
To this point in the argument, the focus has been on the minimal
nature of the perceived benefits of switching from the current no-duty-
to-rescue rule to an affirmative duty-to-rescue rule. As such, the
analysis is vulnerable to the following challenge: why not switch to a
more morally intuitive and satisfying legal rule, even if such a switch is
likely to result in only an insignificant increase in the number of rescue
efforts? Is it not better, particularly from a potential victim's point of
view, to increase the number of rescue efforts modestly than not at all?
After all, an affirmative-duty rule that has only slightly better results
than the current no-duty rule is still a superior ruleY'
To support the no-duty rule in the face of this challenge, likely
costs of an affirmative duty must be identified and shown to outweigh
the modest benefits that an affirmative duty promises. This goal can
be achieved by shifting the standard by which the superiority of one
rule over the other is measured. Thus far, the analysis has proceeded
as if the superior rule is the one that results in the greater number of
rescue efforts when such efforts are reasonable under the circum-
stances. This seems eminently sensible, because most of us, if placed
in a position of peril, would presumably prefer a greater likelihood of
rescue to a smaller one.
1. Refining the Goal of the Doctrine
It is important to recognize, however, that not all rescue efforts,
even efforts deemed reasonable under an affirmative-duty rule, will
result in an improvement in the victim's condition. Inevitably, some
affirmative attempts by strangers to aid others in peril will cause
93. See Eugene Volokh, Duties To Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects ofLaw, 88
GEO. L.J. 105, 106 (1999) ("Those who don't respond to the social norm of helping people in
distress-at least by calling 911-probably aren't likely to be swayed by the normative effect
of a new duty-to-rescue/report law.").
94. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 678 (noting the benefits of an affirmative
duty-to-rescue rule, such as marking societal norms, that are unrelated to the increase in
percentage of potential rescues).
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greater harm than good.95 The best intentioned rescuer could move the
victim of the fresh car accident into a seemingly more comfortable
position and as a consequence aggravate his injuries. The person
seeking to help a stranger in distress on the sidewalk could pick up
their mobile phone and, flustered and distracted, badly misidentify to
emergency personnel the location of the victim.
The fact that an affirmative duty-to-rescue rule would encourage
only reasonable rescue efforts will do nothing to alleviate this problem.
The rule, embedded in negligence law, would compel the potential
rescuer to affirmatively act only if, and only to the extent that, a
reasonably prudent person faced with similar circumstances would
act.96 The incentive to act has its primary effect when the potential
rescuer is faced with the possibility of rescue action ex ante. Thus, the
rule cannot discriminate between rescue efforts that subsequently
benefit the victim and those that go awry.
For example, imagine a defendant who is boating on a lake and
comes across a person stranded in the water, clinging desperately to an
overturned canoe. An affirmative duty-to-rescue rule in negligence
law would expose the defendant to liability if he failed to take
reasonable action to aid the other." So if the defendant could have
easily thrown the victim a flotation device and did not and as a result
the victim suffered greater harm, liability would be likely. If, all things
considered, diving into the water to attempt a more vigorous hand-to-
hand rescue would have exposed the defendant to unreasonable risk,
then the defendant's decision not to do so should trigger no liability.
In neither case, however, should the specific outcome of the
defendant's decision to affirmatively aid properly factor into the
analysis of whether the decision to rescue was reasonable or not. It is,
at least in the abstract, reasonable for the defendant to throw the victim
a flotation device whether the victim is effectively spared from
95. See, e.g., Sagan v. United States, 342 E3d 493, 495-96, 2003 AMC 2597, 2598-
99 (6th Cir. 2003) (reviewing a claim that the Coast Guard delayed a water rescue and
significantly worsened the victim's condition); United States v. DeVane, 306 E2d 182, 183-
86, 1963 AMC 1400, 1401-06 (5th Cir. 1962) (reviewing a claim that the cancellation of a
water search and rescue effort was negligent and proximately caused the death of boat
captain); United States v. Gavagan, 280 E2d 319, 323-30, 1961 AMC 1439, 1443-53 (5th Cir.
1960) (reviewing a claim that the negligent direction of a maritime rescue effort resulted in
the death of shrimp boat crew); United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559, 560-62, 1955 AMC
637, 638-41 (5th Cir. 1955) (finding negligence in allowing an untrained individual to
participate in helicopter rescue that resulted in the death of the victim).
96. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
97. See Eisenberg, supm note 34, at 681-82 (noting a duty-to-rescue rule "imposes an
affirmative obligation" on potential rescuers and that omissions can result in liability).
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drowning or instead the throw is misjudged, strikes the victim on the
head, and takes him under. Similarly, the reasonableness of the
defendant attempting a rescue by personally diving into the water
should be determined independently from the actual outcome of the
rescue effort.
As a consequence, an affirmative duty to rescue will encourage a
greater number of reasonable rescue efforts irrespective of whether or
not these additional rescue efforts result in actual benefit to the victim.
Inevitably, some additional rescue efforts that in fact do the victim no
good or result in greater harm to the victim will occur as a result of the
adoption of an affirmative-duty rule. Under either an affirmative-duty
or a no-duty regime, the actions of a rescuer, once begun, will be
subject to a duty of reasonable care, but that is not relevant one way or
the other to this aspect of the no-duty-to-rescue analysis.
The standard to determine the superiority of either the no-duty or
the affirmative-duty rule should not be the degree to which one rule or
the other encourages a greater number of rescue efforts. Instead, the
more appropriate measure is the degree to which one rule or the other
creates conditions in which the victim's situation is likely to be
improved. The superior rule should result not just in more rescue
efforts, but in more successful rescue efforts.
2. Replacing Higher Quality Rescue Efforts with Lower Quality
Efforts
From this perspective, at least one more characteristic of rescue
situations should be noted. While not always the case, a great many
potential rescue situations possess an aspect of exclusivity. That is to
say, in a large number of circumstances in which a person in peril
needs aid from another, the natural inclination to offer help diminishes
significantly once someone else has begun the effort." It is far less
likely that a bystander will move to help a stranger lying on the ground
in the park in obvious medical distress if he sees that someone else is
already kneeling down beside him. A driver is far less likely to pull his
car over to the side of the road in response to a recent accident if his
will be the third or fourth car to do so.
This natural tendency identifies a potential practical cost of
encouraging a greater number of rescue efforts through adoption of a
98. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 E2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[O]ther
potential rescuers (if any) will be less likely to assist if they see that someone is already at the
scene giving aid."); Romohr, supra note 32, at 1032-33 ("[A] potential rescuer is less likely to
attempt a rescue if another is already giving aid.").
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formal duty to affirmatively aid. The argument goes like this: the only
persons whose behavior will be altered in the switch from a no-duty to
an affirmative-duty rule are the reluctant rescuers, the individuals who
will attempt a rescue effort only under a coercive rule out of fear for
their potential liability if they do not. Given their attitude and
motivation, such rescuers can be expected, in general, to engage in a
lower quality of rescue effort than would a purely altruistic rescuer,
who would choose to act on their own under either legal regime.
Given the often exclusive nature of rescue situations, the actions of a
reluctant rescuer will sometimes preempt, and thereby replace, the
actions of an altruistic rescuer. In such situations, the victim will, as a
result of the existence of the coercive rule, receive a lower quality of
affirmative aid than he otherwise might. This substitution in some
situations of a higher quality altruistic rescuer by a lower quality
reluctant rescuer represents a cost to victims generated by the adoption
of an affirmative duty to aid.
One possible objection to this argument might be that a victim
would prefer even a reluctant rescuer to no rescuer at all in those
situations in which the only possible rescuer is a reluctant rescuer.
While this is almost certainly true, its practical significance may be
quite small.
Remember that reluctant rescuers are those individuals who
would not act to aid the victim in the absence of a legal requirement,
but who would act in the presence of a coercive legal rule.99 Perhaps
some of these individuals would change their behavior out of abstract
respect for the law. Assuming that the overwhelming majority of
reluctant rescuers change their behavior from fear of liability should
they breach the legal duty, it is reasonable to assume that they are more
likely to act in those situations in which their exposure to liability
would be greatest and, conversely, that they would be least likely to act,
even in the presence of a legal duty to do so, in those situations in
which they are unlikely ever to be held legally liable for doing nothing.
Doing nothing, after all, is the preferred behavior of the reluctant
rescuers in the absence of a coercive rule."°°
In a world in which a duty to affirmatively aid exists, a person
could most easily be held liable by the victim for failing to reasonably
aid when the defendant's failure occurred in a setting in which other
99. See supra Part III.A.2.
100. See supra Part III.A.2.
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persons were present.'"' Conversely, the risk of eventual liability for
failing to reasonably act would presumptively be smallest in those
situations in which only the victim and the defendant were present.' 2
Thus, a reluctant rescuer, prepared to reasonably aid another only
because such action will avoid possible liability, is far more likely to
engage in rescue efforts when others are present to observe his failure
to do so than in circumstances where no one else is likely to know of
his failure to act.
Therefore, the presence of a coercive legal duty to affirmatively
aid will most effectively encourage reluctant rescuers to act in those
situations in which other people are present, and these are exactly the
situations in which the actions of the reluctant rescuer are most likely
to supplant more desirable altruistic rescue efforts. It is in those
situations in which no one else is present, and the reluctant rescuer's
actions are most needed by the victim, that the coercive legal rule
generates the weakest incentive for the reluctant rescuer to act.
Thus, while the adoption of an affirmative duty to aid can be
expected to increase the overall number of rescue efforts, the
additional rescue efforts generated by the duty-to-rescue rule can be
expected to be relatively small in number and more likely to occur in
those circumstances in which they would impose an undesirable
burden on the victim by supplanting higher quality efforts to help.
3. Discount of Altruism
Another cost associated with the adoption of an affirmative duty
to aid can be identified by looking at the effect of such a rule on the
majority of persons whose behavior would be unchanged in the shift
from a no-duty to an affirmative-duty regime.0 3 For these individuals
who would shout a warning to those in the path of a runaway shopping
cart and otherwise would act reasonably to aid another in peril, the
adoption of an affirmative-duty rule marks a subtle, but arguably
profound, shift in the social quality of that behavior.
Under the current no-duty doctrine, there is little doubt that those
who undertake rescue efforts on behalf of another are doing so
voluntarily and altruistically, and they may rightfully enjoy higher self-
101. For previously discussed rationales of identification and the disinclination to
attempt rescue when other bystanders are present, see supm Part III.A.2.
102. See supra Part III.A.2.
103. See Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 682 (detailing and responding to the argument
that a duty to rescue may reduce the moral quality of the rescue).
14732008]
TULANE LA W REVIEW
esteem and greater regard by others as a result.'" Conversely, if a legal
duty to affirmatively aid were adopted, these same behaviors by these
same individuals under the same circumstances could be viewed as no
more than mere compliance with the legal requirement, engaged in as
much out of a desire to avoid subsequent legal liability as from
genuine altruism or beneficence. In the eyes of others, and perhaps to
some extent to themselves as well, the nature of their act has been
transformed from the manifestly honorable to the merely compliant.
This effect can be called a discount of altruism. Assuming that
an overwhelming percentage of persons will at least act reasonably on
behalf of another in peril in the absence of a coercive legal rule, then
the adoption of a coercive duty to act will, in a sense, taint the moral
and social quality of socially desirable behavior that would have been
engaged in by the vast majority of persons anyway.' 5 Such altruistic,
praiseworthy behavior will be transformed and diminished to not much
more than ordinary obedience of the law and compliance with the
minimum social expectation that is articulated by that law. While this
may not be a devastating tangible cost of adopting an affirmative duty
to act, it is a significant intangible cost and will affect most persons
who actually engage in affirmative rescue efforts.
4. Greater Intrusiveness of Second-Guessing
Another cost of an affirmative duty to rescue focuses less on a
particular group of actors than on the broader nature of an affirmative
duty to act. The argument begins with an appreciation for the fact that
the great complex of formal second-guessing that is tort law
negligence, unbounded by the prosecutorial discretion that is integral
to criminal law, is a rather intrusive system of oversight and
regulation.'6 As noted earlier, the implicit burden of reasonable care
and the threat of liability for its breach apply to nearly every
imaginable action that can proximately cause harm to another."7
Now, it is one thing to say to the citizens of a jurisdiction that
when you choose to go out in the world and seek your fortune and
your pleasure, you must behave with reasonable care toward other
persons and their property. It seems reasonably appropriate for society
to determine that when individuals venture out to seek their
104. See sources cited supra note 1.
105. See Eisenberg, supm note 34, at 682-83 (noting the moral argument about
diminishing the social quality of the rescue).
106. See supa notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
107. SeeKEETON, DOBBS, KEETON&OWEN, supranote 37, § 33, at 193.
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satisfactions, they should be mindful of and should answer for harm
that they carelessly inflict on others.' 8
On the other hand, it is entirely and importantly different for
society at large to say to an individual that it will not only second-
guess the reasonableness of his behavior when he affirmatively moves
about in the world, but that it will also, with his assets at risk, second-
guess his decision not to act at all." While it may be a fair societal
determination to impose a formal duty of reasonable care when one
enters the game and chooses to play, it is something else altogether to
second-guess the reasonableness of one's decision not to play at all.
It must be remembered here that the affirmative actions taken by
a rescuer, reluctant or voluntary, can always be the object of a
subsequent negligence claim should those actions go awry and cause
greater harm to the plaintiff."' Thus, under an affirmative duty-to-
rescue rule, reluctant rescuers are forced into action when they
otherwise would have done nothing and are then subjected to the
second-guessing mechanism of negligence law with respect to the
quality of those coerced actions. "'
In effect, under an affirmative duty to act, there is no space to
which a person can retreat and, in exchange for doing nothing at all, in
exchange for seeking nothing at all, avoid the otherwise constant gaze
of the reasonably prudent person."2 With an affirmative duty to act,
that final refuge will be penetrated. There will exist no sanctuary in
which the pervasive duty of reasonable care will not reach. The
elimination of that final private space marks a degree of intrusiveness
by negligence law that, while perhaps practically modest, is
theoretically and symbolically profound. It inevitably involves an
undesirable degree of intimate intrusiveness on the autonomy of
individual choice and judgment.
108. Liability for negligence is well-accepted and has been for years. See, e.g.,
Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509.
109. See Silver, supm note 30, at 429-30 (noting the difference between liability for
commissions and omissions).
110. See McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W2d 666, 669 (N.D. 2001) ("[I]f one voluntarily
undertakes to rescue or render aid to a stranger, the rescuer is liable for any physical harm that
results from the failure to exercise reasonable care."); Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864
P2d 839, 842 (Okla. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 323 (1965).
111. See PROSSER, supra note 28, § 56, at 344 ("[T]he good Samaritan who tries to
help may find himself mulcted in damages, while the priest and the Levite who pass by on
the other side go on their cheerful way rejoicing").
112. See id § 56, at 343 (noting that when an affirmative duty to aid exists, a
defendant will be charged with acting reasonably).
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5. Increased Risk of Harm to Rescuers
It was argued earlier that the proper measure of the superior legal
rule regarding rescues should not be the encouragement of the
maximum number of rescue efforts or even the maximum number of
reasonable rescue efforts. Instead, it should be the creation of
conditions which encourage the maximum number of successful
outcomes for the victims in peril.' 3 Additionally, the superior rule
should also encourage the maximum number of successful outcomes
for the individual engaging in the rescue effort. In other words, while
rescue efforts may go awry and place the victims in greater peril, they
may also turn out badly for the rescuers themselves, causing them
harm."
4
It is conventional wisdom in professional lifesaving circles that
unless you are well trained and confident of success, you should not
jump into an emergency situation in an attempt to save another."'
Much too often such behavior results in two victims rather than one
successful rescue. More generally, it is obvious that an attempt to
provide aid to someone in peril could, in a wide range of
circumstances, result in injury or death to the rescuer."'
113. See supm Part III.B. 1.
114. A search in Westlaw's ALLNEWS database on November 6, 2007, for documents
that contained "'good samaritan' w/ 5 (injured or killed)" returned 366 stories for just the past
year. Some of these stories report the same incident, and a few do not report a circumstance
involving injury or death to a Good Samaritan while providing assistance, but the
overwhelming majority do. See, e.g., Kim Bell, Good Samaitan in Sbucks Case Dies, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4392492 (reporting on a Good
Samaritan struck by vehicle while trying to stop a thief); Clarence Williams & Allan Lengel,
Man Klled by Cement Mier, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2007, at B3 (reporting on a Good
Samaritan struck and killed by a truck as he was directing traffic); see also Roberts v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 364 S.E.2d 417, 418-19 (N.C. 1988) (reviewing the case of a Good
Samaritan hit and killed by a car while aiding the victim of an earlier collision); Texaco Ref
& Mktg., Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W2d 61, 63, 1991 AMC 2914, 2915-16 (Tex.
1991) (reviewing the case of a Good Samaritan who helped to free a boat propeller and was
fatally crushed between the boat and a barge).
115. See, e.g., A.J. MCLEAN ET AL., AUSTRALIAN DEP'T OF TRANSP. AND REG'L SERVS.,
CR 59: HEAD AND NECK INJURIES IN PASSENGER CARS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE § 7.2
(1987), http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/1987/Injury-Pass1I.aspx ("[Nion-medical
personnel are often the first to attend to a road crash victim, and if untrained, poorly trained
or careless, they may disregard correct methods of handling spinal injured people and so risk
the victims [sic] entire future."); Steve Hudson, Editor' Repot, DIXIE CONTRACTOR, Feb. 19,
2007, at 5, available at 2007 WL 3473271 ("'Expertise is essential when working to rescue a
trapped person .... Many cases of multiple accidents are the result of unqualified co-
workers or untrained rescuers attempting to save the victim."').
116. See, e.g., Pachesky v. Getz, 510 A.2d 776, 777 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (reviewing
the case of a woman injured while attempting to aid a man whom she observed as
unconscious and slumped over the steering wheel of his car in the middle of the street);
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This is an inherent risk involved in choosing to provide another
with affirmative aid, especially under emergency conditions."'7 It is
part of what makes rescue efforts morally praiseworthy and sometimes
even heroic. It is a risk that every person who provides aid to another
in peril voluntarily assumes under the current no-duty-to-rescue
regime.
This risk, however, under an affirmative duty-to-rescue doctrine,
will fall upon reluctant rescuers only because of their coerced
compliance with the legal rule."8 Some of these reluctant rescuers will
inevitably be injured in the course of their rescue efforts."9 Some will
die.'2° By definition, no reluctant rescuers will suffer such harm under
a no-duty-to-rescue rule, and this difference must be counted as a cost
of an affirmative-duty regime.
This concern can be extended one small step further. Criminals
sometimes prey upon their victims by posing as someone in need of
assistance or emergency aid.'2' For example, a predator could ask for
directions and try to draw the victim into his car to point the way on a
map. A predator could impersonate a motorist stranded on the
shoulder of a remote road next to a disabled automobile. If an
affirmative duty-to-rescue doctrine is to have any practical effect at all,
Joshua Dressier, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About 'Bad Samaritan" Laws, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 971, 984 n.58 (2000) ("[T]here is never true risk-free assistance .... );
Hyman, supm note 32, at 668 ("At least 78 Americans lose their lives every year as a result of
attempting to rescue someone else, while there were only 1.1 deaths per year attributable to
non-rescue.").
117. See Dressier, supm note 116, at 984 & n.58 (arguing that in every case of
assistance there is some level of risk posed to the rescuer).
118. See supra Part III.A.2.
119. See Hyman, supra note 32, at 668-69 ("[A] substantial percentage of risky
rescuers and a significant number of non-risky rescuers were injured-sometimes quite
severely."). This cost is not mitigated, at least from society's perspective, by the existence of
the so-called "rescue rule" that permits a person injured in a non-negligent rescue effort to
recover against any defendant who negligently placed the victim in peril, including the victim
himself. See Dillard v. Pittway Corp., 719 So. 2d 188, 193 (Ala. 1998); Boddie v. Scott, 722
A.2d 407, 412 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Estate of Minser v. Poinsatte, 717 N.E.2d 1145,
1148 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). Frequently the damage award is an insufficient remedy. See
White, supra note 75, at 520-27 (critiquing of the current rescue doctrine as not providing
adequate protection).
120. Seesources cited supranote 114.
121. See, e.g., Sungeeta Jain, Comment, How Many People Does It Take To Save a
Drowing Baby" A Good Samaritan Statute in Washington State, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1181,
1200 (1999); Larry Altman, FirefIghter Who Stopped To Help Motorist Is Robbea DAILY
BREEZE, Dec. 20, 2006, http://www.dailybreeze.com/news/articles/4965466.html; Man Helps
Motoist, Ends Up Carjackead LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (Cal.), July 29, 2007, at A22,
available at 2007 WLRK 14522585; see also Hyman, supra note 32, at 679-80 & n.50 (citing
four examples of published accounts of incidents where Good Samaritans assisted individuals
who later turned on them).
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its presence should result in a greater number of rescue efforts in such
situations as these than would occur in its absence. In every such case
in which the apparent victim in peril is in fact a lure for criminal
activity and the actual victim-rescuer would not have been drawn in
but for the existence of a legal duty to rescue, the resulting harm
inflicted upon the victim is another cost of an affirmative-duty rule.
6. Disincentive To Cooperate in Subsequent Investigations
Consider again the infamous Kitty Genovese incident described
above.' 2 In the current environment in which no duty to rescue, either
civil or criminal, generally exists, an individual who is present when
another is in peril and chooses to do nothing may be subject to moral
condemnation, but they face no exposure to legal liability.' As a
result, their willingness to cooperate with police who may be
investigating the harm suffered by the victim is not affected by the
current status of the legal rule regarding rescues.
All this would change with the adoption of a formal legal duty to
rescue. Under such a rule, all individuals who fail to assist at the scene
of an accident would face the possibility of liability for their failure to
render aid. That is, of course, the intended operation of a duty-to-
rescue doctrine.'2 For those who believe that they may have breached
the legal duty, such a regime would create a significant disincentive to
cooperate with investigations of the incident and with any subsequent
prosecutions. The disincentive would be felt both by those who failed
to act altogether as well as by those who are concerned that they may
not have done enough to satisfy the legal requirement.
This deterrent would be generated by the adoption of either a tort
law or a criminal law duty to rescue. However, with a criminal law
duty to rescue, police and prosecutors would have the option of
granting an important witness immunity for the failure to aid
sufficiently in exchange for their cooperation with the investigation.'
No such option would be available with a tort law duty to rescue.
122. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
124. SeePROSSER, supra note 28, at 343.
125. See Brian Kowalski & Arthur Price, Ethical Obligations Under the New
Approach to Sentencing Guidelines, 17 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 929, 935 (2004) ("In criminal
investigations, prosecutors ... receive cooperation from witnesses to whom immunity is
granted."); Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration
EnforcemenA 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 921 ("Prosecutors routinely use immunity or lower
sanctions to secure cooperation from material witnesses and suspects in criminal and civil
investigations."). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (2000) (defining the witness
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7. Deterrence To Provide Delayed Aid
A formal duty to affirmatively aid would also discourage those
who initially fail to help another in peril from reconsidering their
decision and subsequently taking action. Suppose, for example, that a
driver on a road late at night in a relatively rural area comes across two
badly damaged cars on the shoulder of the road that appear to have just
collided. Both cars are badly damaged. A figure is slumped behind
the steering wheel of one car. Another person is standing on the
shoulder of the road waving for help. Startled by the scene and a little
frightened, the driver drives right past without stopping. After driving
for another minute or two, he calms down a bit and begins to think
about turning around and going back to help.
In the absence of a legal duty to rescue, the ultimate decision will
depend upon each individual's own unique personal complex of
considerations. If there exists a legal duty to affirmatively aid,
however, the potential rescuer must also consider the significantly
increased risk of liability for his initial failure to help. By returning,
the rescuer becomes known and identified. No matter how grateful
the person flagging the driver down may be when he returns, they may
feel differently some time later. How will the person still in their car
and slumped behind the wheel react upon hearing that his rescuer
initially passed them by? Even in merely picking up a mobile phone
and notifying the authorities of the existence and location of the
accident scene, the rescuer's identity and failure to stop initially or
subsequently turn around will be known. Thus, an affirmative duty to
rescue creates barriers for an individual rethinking an initial failure to
aid and considering making an effort at providing delayed aid.
And so, the basic rationale supporting the maintenance of a no-
duty-to-rescue rule in American tort law involves at least seven main
arguments: (1) because of the already high level of uncoerced
reasonable rescue efforts, the increase in the number of such attempts
that will be produced by adoption of a coercive rule will be quite
small; (2) because all of the increase in rescue efforts will come from
reluctant rescuers, because the quality of rescue efforts by reluctant
rescuers generally will be of lower quality than that of purely voluntary
rescuers, and because lower quality coerced rescue attempts will
immunity generally, in court and grand jury proceedings, in administrative proceedings, and
in congressional proceedings). The Department of Justice policy for seeking "use immunity"
can be found in the UNITED STATES ATrORNEYs' MANuAL § 9-23.000 (1997), http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/23mcrm.htm.
2008] 1479
TULANE LA WREVIEW
sometimes replace higher quality voluntary rescue efforts, it is not at
all clear that a person in peril requiring affirmative aid from another
would be better served, as a purely practical matter, by a formal duty to
affirmatively aid; (3) the existence of an affirmative duty to aid would
discount the obvious altruism of otherwise voluntary rescue efforts;
(4) it would be a significant and unwelcome extension of the
intrusiveness of negligence law's duty of reasonable care; (5) it would
increase the risk that harm will be suffered by those providing rescue
efforts; (6) for those who fear that they may have breached an existing
duty to rescue, it would create a disincentive to cooperate with the
authorities or the plaintiff in subsequent investigations of the incident;
and (7) it would deter providing delayed aid.
C Problematic Aspects ofa Breach ofa Duty-To-Rescue Claim
The existence of an affirmative duty to rescue within tort law
would be enforced through a negligence action brought by the victim
or the victim's wrongful death beneficiaries against those persons who
failed to provide the victim with at least reasonable rescue efforts. In a
number of different ways, this would represent a particularly poor
context for the operation of the normal second-guessing mechanism of
negligence.
1. Duty
One difficulty would involve the formulation, even implicitly, of
a consensus regarding the circumstances that should trigger the legal
obligation to affirmatively aid.'26 In other words, just what kind of
peril faced by another is sufficient to compel one to take affirmative
action on their behalf?
There will of course be easy cases, like the person drowning or
being attacked on a public street. But there will be an endless series of
difficult cases: an adult loudly scolding a young child in public,
perhaps using profanity and harsh insults, perhaps also vigorously
shaking the child; teenage siblings locked in a physical wrestling
match that appears to be intensifying and growing more hostile, either
in public or in their own backyard; a nearby passenger on the train who
is having her wallet quietly lifted from her bag by the person sitting
126. See Thomas B. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code, in THE WORKS OF
LORD MACAULAY (Trevelyan ed., 1866), reprinted in THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 159, 161-62 (1983); Epstein, supra note 35, at 198-99.
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next to her; a colleague who is the victim of vicious and false rumors
at the workplace.
Unlike the typical negligence claim, in which the affirmative
action of the defendant invokes the legal obligation to engage in that
action reasonably, breach of a duty to affirmatively aid will require the
decision makers, be it judge or jury, to decide in a wide range of
uncertain circumstances whether any legal obligation existed for the
defendant to have acted at all. Few clear social conventions exist to
guide the formal decision makers in this task or to inform the public at
large about their likely judgments.'27 An enormously wide range of
responses to essentially similar situations could be expected both
within and across jurisdictions, raising serious due process concerns.
Risk-averse individuals might be expected to react to this inevitable
uncertainty by affirmatively acting in an ever greater number of
questionable circumstances.'28
2. Breach
Assume a relatively easy and rather common set of facts in which
most of society would attach a formal duty to rescue: the defendant is
driving on a public road and comes across two cars located on the
shoulder obviously having recently collided with one another. There
are a few people located in and around the cars but no other vehicles in
sight. Apparently the defendant is the first person not directly involved
in the collision to arrive at the scene.
What would be required of the defendant in such a situation to
fulfill a legal duty to reasonably rescue and to avoid liability for a
breach of that duty in a subsequent negligence action? Is making a
call to official emergency services and notifying them of the existence
and location of the accident scene enough? Is it sufficient to wait and
make that call at the next pay phone (increasingly unavailable these
days) if the defendant does not have a mobile phone in the car? Must
127. See Epstein, supm note 35, at 199 (commenting on the unpredictability of
determinations, "it becomes impossible to tell where liberty ends and obligation begins").
128. See Silver, supra note 30, at 431 (1985) (noting that commentators "have
expressed the concern that, in many situations, there would be uncertainty about the need to
intervene, and that this may lead to 'officious intermeddling' in the affairs of strangers"); see
also Harvey A. Hornstein, The Influence of Social Models on Helping, n ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 29, 29-31 (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds., 1970) (noting that when the
behavioral demands of society are unclear, an observer bases his behavior on the behavior of
others).
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the defendant vigorously search for the nearest available pay phone?
Should he exceed posted speed limits in doing so?
Before making a call to the authorities, what kind of precautions
should the defendant take to ensure that he is correct about the location
of the cars and the number and condition of the people on the scene?
Should the defendant at least stop or pause briefly at the scene to
determine the extent of any critical injuries and the general condition
of the victims before determining that a phone call alone is a sufficient
reasonable response?
The answers to the above questions, all absolutely relevant to the
determination of the defendant's actual breach of a duty to reasonably
rescue, could be expected to vary significantly depending on slight
changes in the factual circumstances. How remote was the location of
the accident scene? How heavy or light was the traffic on the road at
the time? Did this occur in the middle of the day or late at night?
What were the weather conditions? How many people did the
defendant see at the scene and in what condition? Were there children,
either with or without adults? How old was the defendant and was he
alone or with others in his car? Has the defendant ever had any
experience or training in rendering emergency aid?
The behavior required of the defendant to satisfy the legal duty
and to avoid subsequent liability will vary significantly based on the
specific answers to these questions and many others. In making the
determination of whether the defendant failed to take sufficient,
reasonable affirmative action to aid the victims, the legal decision
maker will most likely not enjoy the benefit of an existing social
custom or industry standard with respect to such behavior as is often
available in negligence cases. ' This distinguishes the breach in a
duty-to-rescue case from even the most complicated medical
malpractice case, where the jury at least has the benefit of extensive
expert testimony describing the customary professional standard of
care and procedures typically used under circumstances similar to
those faced by the defendant.3
The determination of what a reasonable affirmative response
should be in even the most straightforward factual circumstance is
obviously a very complex and subtle social calculation. It does not
129. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
130. In fact, many states require that a party in a medical malpractice action present
expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care. See, e.g., Todd v. Shankel, No.
02-16359, 2003 WL 22977443, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2003) (Hawaii); Hall v. Arthur, 141
F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arkansas).
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easily yield clear and objective conclusions. It is fraught with value
judgments and beliefs about the appropriate nature of relations and
obligations among strangers in a complicated society.'3' it is
necessarily rooted in cultural and religious traditions and practices.1 2
It is hardly easy work for judges and juries, and the results reached by
them over time and across different jurisdictions can be expected to
vary wildly and frequently be inconsistent and contradictory.'
3. Nature of Evaluation
Even in the small number of cases in which both the need to
affirmatively aid and the nature of a reasonable affirmative response
are fairly determinable, a claim for a breach of a duty to reasonably
rescue is a particularly poor context in which to engage in the usual
second-guessing project of negligence.
Unlike the typical negligence case in which the defendant is
accused of having engaged in some behavior in an unsafe manner, like
failing to adequately maintain the brakes of his car or stocking an
insufficient supply of bottled oxygen in a surgical theater, the
defendant in a breach-of-duty-to-rescue case is most likely confronted
suddenly by the situation of the plaintiff in peril.'34 The circumstances
probably call for a very quick assessment by the defendant and an
equally quick response to provide the plaintiff with effective
assistance, especially if the risk threatening the plaintiff is severe.
A given individual's response when unexpectedly thrust into such
a situation is probably determined, in whole or in part, by largely
immutable elements of their personality: by their quickness of thought
and action, their confidence in the face of pressure to physically
perform, their fear of failure, their tendency to freeze when taken by
131. Steven Hetcher, The Jury Out: Social Norms' Misunderstood Role in
Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 640 (2003) ("[I]t is predictable that jurors, when
attempting to engage in good faith deliberations, will fall back on their ordinary moral
intuitions regarding the demands of reasonableness.").
132. See id at 646-52 (arguing that juries rely on their everyday practices and customs
rather than a cost-benefit analysis in determining reasonableness in negligence liability).
133. See Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty, "79 S. CAL. L. REv.
265, 280 (2006) ("The application of the reasonable person standard requires bringing a
number of considerations to bear and reasonable people may reasonably disagree over how to
evaluate the significance of particular factors even when they agree on the facts." (footnote
omitted)).
134. See, e.g., Buckley, supm note 1 (exemplifying the suddenness of a rescue
situation).
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surprise, their natural athleticism and physicality, etc.'35 This is in
contrast to the typical negligence action where the defendant's
judgment on safety and his willingness to expend resources on
adequate precautions in advance of the actual harm producing
circumstance is the focus of the second-guessing inquiry.'36 For
example, did the defendant reasonably maintain the brakes on his
automobile in the months preceding the actual day that they failed and
the car smashed into the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle? What
procedures did the hospital have in place to ensure that the operating
theaters were adequately stocked with bottled oxygen before and on
the day of the actual injury?
The incentive that negligence law creates for the public at large to
act with reasonable care towards others works best when it reviews the
safety judgment exercised by the actor and can be satisfied by
considered investment in greater precaution.' This incentive is far
less likely to be effective when it is directed, as it most often would be
in failure-to-reasonably-rescue cases, to the quality of the defendant's
reaction to a sudden and highly pressurized situation that demands a
rapid physical response. To the extent that a given individual's ability
to perform in such circumstances is a function of largely immutable
personal characteristics, the threat of legal liability for the failure to
react adequately is unlikely to result in much of an increase in the
actual quality of such reactions.' This is particularly pernicious in a
failure-to-adequately-rescue situation where the defendant's decision to
act at all, and in a way that is now being evaluated for its adequacy,
may well have been influenced, if not coerced, by the very existence of
a duty-to-reasonably-rescue rule.
Moreover, the glacially paced, backward-looking, highly formal
context of negligence litigation is far better suited to a second-guessing
of the defendant's underlying judgment regarding safety and his
investment in adequate precautions. While perhaps not perfect, one
135. See Schiff, supra note 30, at 110 ("The emotions of the bystander who wishes to
intercede but remains undecided do not foster clear and reasonable thinking. Immediately
upon witnessing an accident or violent crime, the would-be Good Samaritan experiences:
'first, the intense emotional shock-characterized predominantly, but not exclusively, by
anxiety; second, the cognitive perception and awareness of what has happened; third, an
inertial paralysis of reaction, which as a non-act becomes in fact an act, and fourth, the self-
awareness of one's own shock anxiety, non-involvement which is followed by a sense of guilt
and intra-psychic and social self-justification."').
136. This is the essence of the Learned Hand formula. See Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (N.Y 1928).
137. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
138. See supia Part III.B.2.
[Vol. 82:14471484
DUTY TO REASONABL YRESCUE
can imagine a jury taking in the offered evidence and then carefully
considering in the leisure and hindsight of its deliberations whether the
defendant took reasonable care of his automobile brakes or took
reasonable measures to ensure that a sufficient supply of bottled
oxygen was present in the operating theater. Far less confidence can
be invested in the thought of these same jurors trying to summon the
specific empathy to place themselves in the emergency situation faced
by the defendant and accurately imagine how they, or a hypothetical
reasonable person, would have reacted.'39 The whole of the defendant's
encounter with the plaintiff in peril and the defendant's response
thereto probably lasted no more than a few minutes. In stark contrast,
the jury's review of the defendant's performance will take place years
later, in the abstract, and at a very deliberate pace.
IV THE PREFERRED LEGAL TREATMENT OF SPECIALLY TRAINED
INDIVIDUALS
A. The Possibility of Craf'ng a Duty To Rescue for Specially
Trained In&viduals
Even accepting that the general population should not have a
formal duty to rescue, does it make sense to add a fourth exception to
the list of established exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule that
would cover only individuals specially trained, experienced, or
possessing a certification in rendering aid?
One argument in favor of such a doctrine is that because such
persons already possess an obligation to affirmatively aid a stranger in
peril arising from the ethical mandates of their profession or a
requirement of licensure, the adoption of a formal duty to affirmatively
aid for such persons would not come with the cost of significantly
discounting the altruism of the act because it is required already. Nor
would it add any additional level of intrusiveness to the formal duty of
reasonable care.' ° Another argument in favor of such a limited duty is
139. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community ofAid: A Rejoinder to Opponents
of Affirmative Duties To Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 26-27 (1993) ("[E]xpansive
territory lies between moral athleticism and minimally decent Samaritarism, and because any
intervention involves at least some risk (if only in the form of opportunity cost), the proof
process would be a difficult one." (footnotes omitted)).
140. For example, an affirmative duty to rescue would not create any additional
obligations for medical professionals. See WORLD MED. Ass'N, WORLD MEDICAL
ASSOCITION INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2006), http://www.wma.net/e/
policy/c8.htm ("A physician shall give emergency care as a humanitarian duty unless he/she
is assured that others are willing and able to give such care."); CANADIAN MED. ASS'N, CODE
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that the risk of low quality rescue efforts would be relatively small,
whether the rescue efforts were purely voluntary or coerced. One
would, therefore, not expect a meaningful difference, on the whole, in
the quality of rescue effort between voluntary and reluctant rescue
efforts that were undertaken by the specially trained. Thus, it could be
reasonably asserted that at least three of the arguments that support the
no-duty-to-rescue rule with respect to the public at large do not apply,
either at all or with nearly the same force, to those who possess special
training, experience, or certification in emergency aid.
On the other side of the issue, those with special training could be
divided into two groups: those who operate under an independent
professional obligation to affirmatively aid and those who do not.'4'
For those who possess an obligation not arising from any duty of care
in negligence law, the existence of a formal legal duty would be
superfluous. Among this group, one would expect the adoption of a
legal duty to rescue to generate no more than a trivial number of
additional rescue efforts, if it encouraged any additional rescue efforts
at all. Thus, the substantive effect of adopting such an affirmative duty
would be practically nil, consigning to irrelevance, for the purpose of
this analysis, the higher quality of coerced rescue efforts, the lower
discount of altruism, and the smaller degree of intrusion that might
exist within this group.
Among the other group, those specially trained individuals who
do not bear an extralegal obligation to provide affirmative aid to a
stranger, it should be conceded that the quality of coerced rescue is
likely to be higher than the quality of rescue efforts coerced from
reluctant rescuers at large, and probably high enough, given their
special training, not to pose any significant problem for those in peril.
Despite a higher quality of coerced rescue efforts, however, the
OF ETHICS No. 18 (2004) ("Provide whatever appropriate assistance you can to any person
with an urgent need for medical care.").
141. The Principles of Medical Ethics (Principles) adopted by the American Medical
Association in 1957 included the statement: "A physician may choose whom he will serve.
In an emergency, however, he should render service to the best of his ability." AM. MED.
ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5, at 2 (1958). The rendering of this standard,
adopted in the 1980 and 2001 versions of the Principles, softens the articulation of this
obligation dramatically, transforming it into, at most, an implicit implication of the statement.
The current version of the principle reads, "A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate
patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to
associate, and the environment in which to provide medical care." AM. MED. ASS'N,
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS princ. VI (2001). Both versions of the principles are
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4256.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2008).
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number of additional rescue efforts induced by a formal duty imposed
upon the specially trained would be quite small and very much smaller
than among the population at large. After all, in contrast to the general
population, those who possess special training can be supposed to be a
self-selected group that voluntarily sought to improve its ability to be
of help to others in peril and thus is much more likely to use its
heightened skills to provide aid voluntarily. Specially trained and
experienced individuals are. also far less likely than untrained
individuals to panic in the face of an emergency of this sort and are
therefore less likely to be inhibited by fright or anxiety from helping
another in peril.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the discounting of
altruism and the greater intrusiveness of second-guessing arguments
against the adoption of an affirmative duty to rescue would have any
less force among this group than they would with respect to the public
at large. The same is true with respect to the increased risk of harm to
rescuers, the disincentive to cooperate in subsequent investigations,
and the deterrence to provide delayed aid arguments.
Further, with respect to specially trained people in either
subgroup, a limited affirmative duty designed to pertain only to them
would come with its own rather significant costs. For example, how
might one functionally define the specialized group to whom the
affirmative duty to rescue would apply? How much and what kind of
training or experience should be required? How recent should the
training or experience be? How close to the focus of the defendant's
training should the aid required by the person in peril be in order to
invoke the affirmative duty? None of these questions have obvious
answers, and the working out of the contours of the rule in each
jurisdiction, along with the resulting uncertainty among the specially
trained, will consume resources and constitute costs.'
4 2
Finally, the adoption of a formal legal duty to rescue that applies
only to the specially trained will act as a deterrent for some individuals
who otherwise might seek, or agree to receive, such special training.
Such a deterrent compromises the larger social goal of creating
142. See, e.g., Carl V Nowlin, Note, Don't Just Stand There, Help Me!. Broadening
the Effect of Minnesota Good Samaritan Immunity Through Swenson v. Waseca Mutual
Insurance Co., 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1001, 1010-14 (2004) (tracing the development of
Minnesota's affirmative duty to rescue).
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conditions that maximize the possibility of those in peril receiving
quality aid and being successfully rescued.'
43
B. The Undesirability ofNeural Treatment for Specially Tmined
Indviduals
All things considered, the lack of an affirmative duty to rescue
applicable only to the specially trained seems, while perhaps not
inevitable, at least fully understandable. Yet, simply to abandon the
analysis at this point would leave it wanting. Without something more,
tort law would simply operate with a no-duty-to-rescue rule that would
apply to the regular individual and to the specially trained individual in
the same manner. This is arguably unsatisfactory for at least two
reasons.
The first is that, at least from the perspective of the person in
peril, the affirmative aid of a specially trained individual will probably
be far more valuable than the rescue efforts of an untrained and
inexperienced person. A tort law regime that treats both of them alike
is therefore less desirable than one that more vigorously encourages
affirmative aid from the specially trained. This is especially true when
one continues to consider the quasi-exclusive nature of many rescue
situations. Once again, it can be argued that the creation of an
incentive for reluctant rescuers to affirmatively aid is less attractive
than it may seem due to lower quality reluctant rescue efforts
potentially replacing higher quality altruistic rescue efforts. Such a
tort law rule that treats equally the specially trained and the untrained
individual can be faulted for failing to minimize these situations in
which a lower quality rescue effort by an untrained individual will
effectively replace a higher quality rescue effort by a specially trained
person. A superior liability regime is one that would generate a
stronger incentive for the specially trained to act than it would for an
untrained individual.
Secondly, there is some reason to believe that those individuals
who are specially trained in disciplines most likely to be relevant to
rescue situations, like physicians, might actually be less willing than
untrained individuals to engage in voluntary rescue efforts in the
absence of a coercive legal rule." The argument here rests upon the
143. See Hyman, supra note 32, at 684 & n.73 (noting the argument that an imposition
of liability on potential rescuers will encourage them to avoid situations where they could
have to rescue someone).
144. See Robert Dachs, Curbside Consultation: Emergency Response, 67 Am. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 2423, 2423 (2003) ("Despite the professional and humanitarian desire to assist in
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notorious distrust and suspicion that communities of recurring
defendants in tort cases, like physicians, have developed regarding the
fairness and accuracy of the judgment of courts, and especially juries,
in negligence cases.14  The literature of such professions is replete with
complaints about the unfair operation of negligence law, stories of
outrageous outcomes in specific cases, and proposals for reform.' 6
Specially trained individuals who are regularly exposed to this
literature, and who might share many of these same sentiments, may
be reluctant to affirmatively aid another when such a situation arises.
They may well fear that should things go badly for the victim, the
cases of emergencies, concern about legal reprisal might result in a physician's inclination to
shy away from rendering assistance. ); Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment, No Duty To
Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a Victim Lying in the Street? What Is Left of the
American Rule, and Will It Survive Unabated, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 353, 364 (1999) ("[D]octors
can find themselves in rescue situations without proper equipment or sanitation. Thus,
doctors could decide it would be wiser not to rescue a victim and avoid liability than to rescue
a victim and risk being sued for medical malpractice." (footnote omitted)).
145. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modem Malpractice Law,
87 IOWA L. Rev. 909, 921-50 (2002) (reviewing five arguments frequently used to support
medical professionals' skepticism of a jury's ability to fairly and accurately determine the
correct standard of care).
146. See, e.g., Tanya Albert, Lawyers Try New Tacks in Malpractice Suits, AM. MED.
NEWS, Feb. 9, 2004, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/0 2/09/prcaO2O9 .htm ("Just as
quickly as medical knowledge and disease treatment options increase, so too do advances in
the strategies lawyers use to bring medical malpractice lawsuits. Last year, an Ohio jury
awarded $3.5 million to the family of a man who died of a heart attack. His family claimed
that the physician didn't do enough to help the man lose weight and stop smoking, given that
physicians now know how smoking and excess weight contribute to heart disease and given
the significant advances in treatment."); Defensive Medicine: Sacrificing Quality Care, But
Can the Trend Be Changed, PHYSICIAN'S WEEKLY, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.physicians
weekly.com/article.asp?issueid=317&articleid=2982&printable=1 ('Although only a small
number of physicians report that malpractice concerns are the reason for their decisions to
admit a patient to the hospital or to order a specific test, data on triage and test ordering
decisions in real life cases suggests that malpractice concerns are a much greater factor than
physicians believe."' (quoting David A. Katz, MD)); Donald J. Palmisano, Health Care in
Crisis, 109 CIRCULATION 2933, 2933 (2004) ("The most threatening component of the
healthcare storm, however, is a broken medical liability system that defies common sense and
reason."); Press Release, Project on Med. Liab. in Pa., New Survey Says Mounting Medical
Malpractice Costs in PA Affect Doctors' Decisions to Stay in State (July 7, 2005), available at
http://pdfserver.emediawire.com/pdfdownload/259084/pr.pdf ("A new survey published this
month in 'Obstetrics and Gynecology', indicates that the high cost of medical malpractice
insurance is a major reason why the medical residents surveyed plan to leave Pennsylvania
upon completing their training."). But see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 268-69 (1995) (describing a group that believes there is no
crisis unfairly applying negligence law).
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reasonableness of their behavior in the circumstances will not be fairly
or accurately judged in any subsequent negligence action.'47
To the extent that this is true, the existence of such a dynamic
would indeed be ironic. Negligence law's efforts to encourage
specially trained individuals to affirmatively aid when reasonable and
necessary would be compromised in part by the mistrust of these very
individuals in the fair operation of negligence law itself. In such
circumstances, increasing the pressure on specially trained individuals
by creating a coercive rule that applies only to them is likely to be
counterproductive. If they are already more reluctant than they might
otherwise be to render aid voluntarily for fear of unfair treatment in a
subsequent negligence action, expansion of negligence law's
jurisdiction in these situations is hardly likely to help. After all, the
regulated individual's distrust of that very system of negligence may be
the source of their reluctance to act.'
A hypothetical illustration can demonstrate this point. Imagine a
commercial airliner on a flight from Hawaii to California located
midway across the Pacific Ocean flying at 30,000 feet. A passenger on
board the plane begins to experience symptoms of a severe heart
attack.' 9 His condition is apparently worsening. The stewards rush
back to the passenger's seat on the plane and carry him up the center
aisle to the front galley where they lay him down. They activate the
intercom on the plane, explain the situation, and ask if any one among
147. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F PARTLETr, supM note 37,
at 425 ("While liability is aimed at deterring negligence, it may deter doctors from providing
emergency medical assistance. The doctors are concerned about potential malpractice suits,
especially when they are obliged to work on the scene of an emergency without any
equipment, without proper sanitation, and without any assistance.").
148. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
149. The Federal Aviation Administration estimates that an average of fifteen medical
emergencies occur daily on U.S. airlines and that the number of such emergencies has more
than doubled in the last decade. Tamar Nordenberg, Air Aid- Medical Kits Reach New
Heights, FDA CONSUMER, Jan-Feb. 1998, http://www.fda.gov/FDAC/features/1998/198_
air.html.
Illness on board an aircraft is a significantly more serious risk than an aircraft crash.
More than 100 people each year die in flight or soon after landing as a result of suffering a
medical emergency on a major American airline. Matthew L. Wald, Saving Lives in the
Skies, N.Y TIMES, May 2, 2004, § 5, at 2. The three most common in-flight medical
emergencies on American Airlines are cardiac events, seizures, and asthma attacks, with
cardiac emergencies outnumbering the others. Special Report: Cabin Safety: Bodily Fluids
a Fact ofLife for In-Flight Heart Emergencies, AIR SAFETY WEEK, Mar. 13, 2000. Asthma is
the most common life-threatening condition reported by British Airways. Nigel Dowdall, "'Is
There a Doctor on the Aircafi?'" Top 10 In-Flight Medical Emergencies, 321 BRITISH MED. J.
1336, 1336 (2000). Several babies are born on aircraft traveling in international airspace
every year. Id at 1337; see, e.g., S.A. Reid, Doctors Deliver Baby on Airliner, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 26, 2007, at Al, available at2007 WLNR 9886334.
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the other passengers on board is a physician or possesses any
specialized medical training and if they would be willing to come up to
the front of the plane and provide emergency aid to the distressed
individual.' 0  No one responds. Another request, and again no
response. The passenger dies before the plane can touch down in
California. Suppose further that some subsequent investigation locates
the passenger manifest for the flight and determines that one or more
persons on board were in fact fully licensed physicians.'5 ' A bizarre
and unrealistic scenario?' 2 As noted at the beginning of this Article, in
May 2006 a climber attempting to descend from the top of Mt. Everest
fell into distress not far from the summit and was ignored and
abandoned by approximately forty other climbers who walked right
past him, most of them twice. While conditions near the summit of
Mt. Everest may be uniquely hostile, it is certainly fair to presume that
climbers of the caliber and experience necessary to place themselves
within 1000 feet of the world's highest peak are thoroughly trained in
at least the rudiments of providing aid to other climbers in distress.
And yet, among this exceptionally elite group, not a single one
reportedly did anything to help.'53
150. See, e.g., John Kron, Flying into Trouble: Acting as a Good Samaritan Can Be a
Frustrating Experience-As One Sydney GP Found Out, AUSTRALIAN DOCTOR, Apr. 18,
2008, at 39.
15 1. One source states, "There is a physician passenger on board a commercial flight
40-90% of the time." Id. See generally The Law Report, Health Law.- Part Two (Australian
Broadcasting Corp. radio broadcast Aug. 3, 1999), available athttp://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/
8.30/lawrpt/lstories/lr990803.htm) (transcript) (discussing the frequency of medical
emergencies on airplanes and Australia's imposition of liability on physicians who do not
respond to an emergency on a plane).
152. Approximately 1000 people die each year as a result of a medical emergency on
board an airplane, which is more than the annual number of deaths from airplane crashes,
according to the Aviation Institute in Oxford. Dachs, supra note 144, at 975; The Law
Report, Health Law. Part Two, supra note 151; see also Dowdall, supra note 149, at 1336
("in the year ending 31 March 1999 British Airways carried 36.8 million passengers and
there were 3386 reported in-flight medical incidents: about 1 per 11 000 passengers. Though
70% were managed by cabin crew without the assistance of an on-board health professional,
in almost 1000 incidents doctors and nurses were asked to help with the management of ill
passengers."); Samantha Gross, Dealing with Death, In-Flight, VA. PILOr & LEDGER-STAR,
Feb. 29, 2008, at 3, available at 2008 WLNR 4019442 (describing how airlines handle in-
flight deaths). It has been reported that psychiatrists are often especially concerned about
responding to a request for in-flight medical assistance. Dowdall, supia note 149, at 1337.
Medical emergencies are already the leading cause of diverting aircraft. Mick Hamer,
Giant Plane Raises Fear of Meoical Emergencies, NEW SCIENTIST, May 20, 2005, at 8,
available at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mgl8625004.900.html. Both the
advent of much larger commercial airliners that can carry far greater numbers of passengers
and the trend for more elderly persons to fly has caused some observers to predict an increase
in onboard medical emergencies in the near future. Id; Wald, supa note 149.
153. See supia text accompanying notes 18-27.
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Consider then the physicians on board the airplane who chose not
to respond to the stewards' calls for help.'54  Should they simply be
regarded as moral monsters? What could they possibly say by way of
justification for their actions?
Perhaps they could say something like the following:
"Yes, I am an experienced and licensed physician; yes, I was
on board that plane and heard the request for assistance; and yes,
I chose not to respond. Because I am a physician I could see
when the passenger was carried up to the front of the plane by my
seat that he was in a grave and near terminal condition.
I knew from my watch that we were nowhere near land and
that it was unlikely that this man would survive until touch
down.' I suppose I could have gone to the front galley and tried
154. The hypothetical scenario offered here is intentionally simple and dramatic. It
can serve to help frame the reasons why a specially trained person may choose not to offer
assistance in an emergency situation without being at all representative of the response of
such persons in such situations. In contrast, and in fairness, it is worth noting an incident that
actually occurred on a commercial flight from Philadelphia to Orlando in December 2003. A
sixty-seven-year-old woman flying from her home in Liverpool, England, to her daughter's
wedding in Florida experienced massive pains in her chest and arm not long after the plane
departed from Philadelphia on the second leg of the flight. When stewards assessed her
condition as serious and inquired over the cabin sound system whether there was a physician
on board willing to help, no fewer than fifteen cardiologists, all on their way to a convention
in Florida, rushed down the aisle and treated her. Though she subsequently spent time in the
intensive care ward of an Orlando hospital, the passenger survived. John Mahoney, Soaper
Star; Cardo Docs in Mid-Air Rescue, DAILY STAR (U.K.), Jan. 1, 2004, at 22; Geoff Marsh, Is
There a Doctor on Board? Yes, Er, 15 of Us Mid-Air Medics Flock To Save Heart Victim 67,
ExPREss (U.K.), Jan. 1, 2004, at 22; see also Stephen Franks, Is There a Doctor on the Plane?,
34 MED. EDUC. 1043, 1043 (2000) (providing a first-hand account of a passenger-physician
responding to a medical emergency on board a commercial flight).
The degree to which specially trained individuals are generally willing to help in such
circumstances is necessarily speculative. One reason for this is that Good Samaritan statutes,
and the inducement to act that they provide, now exist in all fifty states and have been around
since the late 1950s. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of
"Good Samalitan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294, 300 (1989); infia Part IVC. Thus no current
or recent studies could easily capture the willingness of specially trained individuals to
affirmatively aid in the absence of such statutes. It is also difficult to develop even an
anecdotally based sense of the probable degree of voluntary affirmative aid because incidents
of individuals failing to aid are, by their nature, very unlikely to be discovered and reported in
the media, especially when no legal duty to aid exists that might spark an official
investigation. See sources cited supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty in
identifying and discovering persons who ignored an opportunity to reasonably aid another in
peril).
155. The World Medical Association has adopted as its official policy the following
statement:
The environment in normal passenger planes is not conducive to the provision of
quality medical care, especially in the case of medical emergencies. Noise and
movement of the plane, a very confined space, the presence of other passengers
who may be experiencing stress or fear as a result of the situation, the insufficiency
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to make him comfortable and perhaps provide some solace, but
with only the equipment and medications available on board, I
knew that his chances for survival were small and that the odds of
saving his life were very slim.1
56
What do you think was most likely to happen had I provided
him aid and he died before landing as he was almost certain to
do? I would find myself, some months down the road, a
defendant in a negligence action in which the lawyers for the
estate would try to convince a naive and technically ignorant jury
that if only I had thought to perform some improbable procedure
with the materials at hand, I could have saved the man's life. And
in such circumstances my hard-earned professional reputation,
my financial resources, and my liability insurance coverage
would all be ultimately exposed to the judgment of those
untrained and inexperienced jurors.
No, I thought to myself. On balance, the meager benefit that
I might provide to that unfortunate man is outweighed by the
enormous risk to which I would expose myself."'' 7
To the extent that this imagined justification for inaction is
realistic, the existence and operation of negligence law itself can be
considered to be operating as a deterrent to the very behavior by the
very individuals that we, on behalf of those who are facing such a
peril, would most want to encourage. This effect is reinforced by the
fact that in most potential rescue situations, unlike the case of the
airplane, it is extremely difficult for a potential plaintiff to identify
those individuals, specially trained or not, who quietly and
anonymously choose not to render any aid.' 8 Thus, in most cases, a
or complete lack of diagnostic and therapeutic materials and other factors create
extremely difficult conditions for diagnosis and treatment. Even the most
experienced medical professional is likely to be challenged by these circumstances.
World Med. Ass'n, The World Medical Association Resolution on Medical Assistance in Air
Travel (2006), http://www.wma.net/e/policy/a26.htm.
156. Federal regulations require that a basic emergency medical kit be on board all
U.S. commercial airliners. 14 C.FR. § 121.803 (2007); see also Thomas N. Bettes & David
K. McKenas, Medical Advice for Commercial Air Tmvelers, 60 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 801,
802 (1999) ("[T]he contents of the kits are limited and are intended for basic emergency
treatment only, not to sustain or treat critically ill passengers on extended flights.").
157. See, e.g., Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 E3d 1515, 1517, 1528 (11 th
Cir. 1997) (upholding the district court's finding that, notwithstanding a physician's medical
advice that the passenger was not suffering from heart attack symptoms, the airline
employees were negligent in not scheduling an emergency landing).
158. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 30, at 433 ("Some critics question the enforceability
of the duty. They worry that nonrescuers would often be difficult to trace, and nearly
impossible when not witnessed by others."); Volokh, supra note 93, at 106 ("The law's
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specially trained individual who decides not to affirmatively aid and
thus discretely moves along, or away, faces little risk of identification
and subsequent suit.
At this point, common law tort doctrine, exclusively dependent
upon the negative reinforcement regime of threatened liability, has
exhausted its options. '59 While it would be desirable legally to
encourage specially trained individuals to engage in reasonable rescue
efforts, the prospects of doing so through the creation of a formal legal
duty within negligence law are thin.'" In fact, as previously discussed,
it is indeed possible that the existence of a negligence-based duty of
care invoked after the specially trained individual acts deters such
rescue efforts.'61
coercive force, moreover, will be rather low, because the witnesses know they're unlikely to
be conclusively identified if they just stay quiet.").
159. Nothing in the traditional common law of tort provides a mechanism for
rewarding or compensating a successful voluntary rescuer. Some jurisdictions have created a
fund from which rescuers may be compensated if they are injured in the course of aiding a
victim of crime. Seevictims of Crimes Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10608 (2000); Desmond S.
Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective on the Compensation of Cime Victims in the United
States, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 350 (1994). For a very sophisticated analysis of
the optimal mix of rewards and punishments in the realm of affirmative aid, see Levmore,
supra note 35, at 886-91.
160. See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (stating that a license
permitting a physician to practice medicine does not require him to practice and permits him
to refuse to render aid without reason).
161. See Franldin, supra note 61, at 52 (noting that Good Samaritan statutes were
passed "in response to assertions that the growing concern about malpractice suits resulted in
having significant numbers of physicians drive past accidents rather than stop to render aid").
Professor Franklin includes in note 13 of his article the following passage from the American
Medical Association:
"Early in 1961 the Law Medicine Research Institute of Boston University
conducted a 10% sample survey of the practicing physicians in Massachusetts.
Among other things, the physicians were asked to assume that they were enjoying
an evening at the theater. They were then queried if they would answer the call, 'Is
there a doctor at the house?' 27% replied that they would; 41% replied that they
would if they saw no other doctor responding; 14% replied that they would if they
could first determine what the trouble was; 16% said no; the remaining 2% failed
to answer the question. 76% of those who said they would not respond indicated
that the fear of a malpractice suit was their principal reason for not doing so; 51%
of those who said they would only respond after they had found out what was
wrong expressed concern of a malpractice suit; 35% of those who said they would
respond if no other doctor would indicated that fear of a malpractice suit was the
thing which held them back."
Id at 52-53 n. 13 (quoting Theodore Flowers & William J. Kennedy, Note, Good Samaritan
Legislation: AnAnalysis and a Proposal, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 418, 419 n.10 (1965)).
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C The Function of Good Samaritan Statutes
In the face of this circumstance, tort law has taken an interesting
twist. Lacking a negative reinforcement strategy that is likely to
succeed, it has instead sought to offer a carrot, though one of a
peculiarly tort-like nature. Rather than offering a tangible reward to
those who engage in reasonable rescue efforts, as one might expect
from a positive reinforcement scheme, tort law promises not to hit
them with potential liability quite as hard as it otherwise might.'62 In
effect, tort law offers to voluntary rescuers the prospect of having their
rescue efforts judged in any subsequent negligence action by a lowered
standard of care or even, perhaps, not to have their rescue efforts
second-guessed at all.'63
These carrots are offered to potential rescuers by laws that are
commonly referred to as Good Samaritan statutes.'" As a general
matter, Good Samaritan statutes modify the usual duty of care standard
ordinarily applied in a negligence action that is based upon a plaintiff's
assertion that the careless rescue efforts of the defendant harmed
him.'6 These statutes can lower the usual standard in various ways,
such as by requiring the court to apply an unmodified reasonable
person duty of care to the actions of a specially trained individual or
requiring the use of a gross or reckless negligence standard.' They
can also go even further by eliminating the possibility of a subsequent
negligence action altogether.'67
As to the beneficiaries, Good Samaritan statutes can make these
incentives available to all persons who engage in reasonable rescue
efforts,'68 or they can instead offer them only to those possessing
special training or experience.' 9 Moreover, more sophisticated Good
Samaritan arrangements can mix and match these options so that
persons possessing different levels of training and experience are
offered correspondingly different levels of inducement.'70
162. At present, all states in the United States have at least one Good Samaritan
statute. California was the first state to enact such a statute in 1959. For an excellent
description of the current Good Samaritan statutory scheme in California, see ANN TAYLOR
SCHWING, CALIFORNIA AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES § 38:46(2008).
163. Id.
164. SeeNowlin, supm note 142, at 1006-10.
165. Seeid
166. See, e.g, ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (2006).
167. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2000) (requiring only "good faith").
168. See, e.g., IOWACODE § 613.17 (1998).
169. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2727.5 (West 1974).
170. SeeVeilleux, supa note 154, at 325-26.
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Good Samaritan statutes in general encourage voluntary rescue
efforts by decreasing legal exposure and thus lowering the risk of a
voluntary rescue effort.' 7' This is especially true in the case of
specially trained individuals. 7 2 By this device, negligence law, in a
sense, moves or is pushed out of the way, and we rely upon the strong
moral value of voluntarily helping another in peril to take over and
produce sufficient reasonable rescue efforts.
Now that Good Samaritan statutes have become common in this
country, the adoption of a formal affirmative duty to rescue becomes
even more problematic. The practical consequence of a formal duty to
rescue combined with a Good Samaritan statute that applies to all
rescuers would be to coerce some additional rescues and to then judge
the quality of the reluctant rescue effort on a lower than normal
standard of care, or to not formally second-guess the quality of the
reluctant rescue effort at all. However, an important argument against
an affirmative duty to rescue is a concern for lower quality reluctant
rescue efforts replacing higher quality voluntary rescue efforts, the
consequences of which will only intensify if the reluctant rescuer
either faces no liability or his effort is held to a lowered standard by the
operation of a Good Samaritan statute.
V THE RELATIVE SUPERIORITY OF A CRIMiNAL LAW DUTY To
RESCUE
The arguments offered above to support the practical wisdom of a
lack of a duty-to-rescue rule in tort law can also be applied to support
the current absence of a criminal law obligation to reasonably rescue in
nearly all jurisdictions in the United States. A high level of uncoerced
compliance, the expected performance of reluctant rescuers,
replacement of higher quality rescue efforts with lower quality efforts,
discount of altruism, increased risk of harm to rescuers, and deterrence
171. See Nowlin, supra note 142, at 1006-07 (noting that the purpose of Good
Samaritan statutes is to encourage emergency care by limiting liability).
172. There is, of course, disagreement about the degree to which these statutes have in
fact encouraged additional rescue efforts by specially trained individuals. See, e.g., Eric A.
Brandt, Comment, Good Samarttan Laws-The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17
AKRON L. REv. 303, 331-33 (1983); Robert A. Mason, Comment, Good Samanttan Laws-
Legal Disarray: An Update, 38 MERCERL. REV. 1439, 1459-60 (1987).
A study done by the American Medical Association in 1963 is often cited in this regard.
Based on a survey of physicians, the study reported that 51.5% indicated that they would stop
and provide assistance to a stranger suffering a medical emergency if a Good Samaritan
statute were in effect while 48.8% said that they would do so if no such statute existed. Law
Dep't of the Am. Med. Ass'n, First Results: 1963 Professional-Liability Survey, 189 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 859, 865 (1964).
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to provide delayed aid all justify a continued absence of a criminal law
duty as forcefully as they support the absence of a tort law duty.
Assume, however, that the pressure to adopt a legal rule that more
accurately reflects the preferred moral position in this area becomes
too great to resist and a formal legal obligation to reasonably rescue
must be adopted. In such a circumstance, the adoption of a criminal
law duty would be far preferable to a tort law duty. Moreover, if a
criminal law duty were adopted and nearly all of the advantages
deriving from such a legal obligation were achieved, any potential
advantage from an additional adoption of a tort law duty would be
marginal.
The critical advantage that a criminal law duty to rescue would
have over a tort law duty to rescue is the existence of prosecutorial
discretion. Violations of criminal law statutes do not result in actual
criminal prosecution until the appropriate government authority has
examined the situation and determined that the defendant's behavior,
all things considered, warrants the allocation of public resources in the
pursuit of a criminal conviction.'73 In sharp contrast, a tort plaintiff
operates under no such formal constraints or public concern and is
largely free to pursue civil liability against a defendant whenever the
claim is at least plausible.7
The necessary exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal
context means that a criminal duty to rescue can formally exist in the
statutes, reinforcing the moral standard so articulated, and yet be
brought to bear against a defendant who has failed to affirmatively aid
only in those situations in which the defendant's failure to act warrants
prosecution, such as if he has exhibited exceptional callousness or
173. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("This broad discretion
rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to
judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence
value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the
Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the
courts are competent to undertake."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In
our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
174. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386
(2004) ("In the criminal justice system, there are various constraints, albeit imperfect, to filter
out insubstantial legal claims. The decision to prosecute a criminal case, for example, is
made by a publicly accountable prosecutor subject to budgetary considerations and under an
ethical obligation, not only to win and zealously to advocate for his client but also to serve the
cause of justice. The rigors of the penal system are also mitigated by the responsible exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. In contrast, there are no analogous checks in the civil discovery
process here.").
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unquestionably reprehensible conduct. Similarly, prosecutors can
choose to pursue only those cases that are most likely to send a
positive message about reasonable rescue to the public at large without
unduly aggravating its possible costs.'75 None of this careful tailoring
of a formal duty to rescue is available in the case of tort law. There the
plaintiff is not constrained by such factors in choosing whether or not
to seek redress from the defendant and, moreover, looks to the
possibility of personal financial gain from the success of the action.'76
Thus, a criminal law duty to rescue could be adopted only to have
very little, if any, actual prosecution take place pursuant to the statute.
In this way, the law can conform in a more satisfying manner to
prevailing public morality on the issue of reasonable rescue without
generating unwanted litigation or incurring other associated costs. In
fact, there is some strong indication that this is the de facto state of
affairs in those very few jurisdictions that have adopted this criminal
standard.'" Such a strategy of announcement without aggressive
enforcement could never be reliably pursued in the case of a tort law
duty to rescue because, being a civil action, the government does not
control the cause of action.
In addition to the tremendous advantage that the existence of
prosecutorial discretion gives to a criminal law duty to rescue over a
similar tort law duty, a criminal law duty may also avoid some of the
costs associated with a tort law duty. For example, a criminal law
statute could define the obligation to provide reasonable rescue efforts
without requiring that the defendant's failure to do so actually result in
greater injury to the person in peril, thus avoiding difficult problems of
negative causation that are unavoidable in the tort context.'78 Similarly,
prosecution under a criminal statute need not involve placing a specific
175. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
176. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 386 (noting lack of limitations on a plaintiff bringing a
case).
177. See sources cited supm note 61 (noting that few or no prosecutions have resulted
in the states with an affirmative duty).
178. SeeAdler, supra note 32, at 912-13 ("It is argued that where there is a failure to
rescue, the potential rescuer has in no way increased the risk of harm to the victim and
therefore cannot be culpable. However, in other contexts, the inability to prove physical
causation will not always prevent the imposition of legal responsibility. In criminal law, for
example, where a father fails to save an infant from drowning, 'illegal inaction' may support
criminal sanctions." (footnote omitted)); John Kleinig, Ciminal Liability for Failures To Act,
49 L. & CoNrEv. PROBS. 161, 178 (1986) ("Why, it might be asked, is anything as strong as
a causal thesis required to hold people criminally liable for their failures to act? ... The
lifesaver who fails to go to someone's rescue may be held liable, not because he was a causal
factor in that person's drowning, but because, having some control over the outcome, he
failed to act to prevent it.").
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dollar value on the additional harm caused to the victim by the
defendant's failure to reasonably help, a highly speculative and
uncertain aspect of any successful tort action for failure to aid.
Furthermore, unlike tort law, criminal law's ability to impose on
the defendant a sanction that is not directly measured by the harm
caused to the plaintiff allows criminal law to fashion a penalty for
failure to rescue that is carefully tailored to the moral culpability of the
defendant's behavior under the specific circumstances of the case. '
Thus, a criminal law duty could much more appropriately handle a
situation where the defendant unreasonably, but not egregiously, failed
to provide assistance to another who then suffered serious injury or
death.'80 Tort law damages in such a circumstance would necessarily
be measured by the harm suffered by the plaintiff rather than the moral
culpability, beyond mere unreasonableness, exhibited by the defendant.
Finally, the argument against a tort law duty to rescue based on
the greater intrusiveness of the second-guessing that would be imposed
does not carry quite the same force with respect to a criminal law duty
to rescue. Since the New Deal and the rise of the modem
administrative state, legal obligations to take affirmative action and not
just avoid harm-producing behavior are hardly unknown. One obvious
example is the obligation to report and pay income tax.'8' These
obligations, though often regulatory in nature, are frequently enforced
by a criminal sanction. 2 Thus, a criminal duty to affirmatively aid
179. See Franklin, supra note 61, at 55 & n.29 (noting that through its legislature, a
state can impose a penalty for a failure to rescue through criminal statutes based more on the
community's moral attitudes than the actual damages of the offense).
180. For example, the Dutch criminal statute establishing an affirmative duty to aid
provides for a maximum of only three months in prison for an unreasonable failure to aid
another who subsequently dies as a result. See supm note 30 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)-(d) (2000) (imposing an income tax on married
individuals, heads of households, and unmarried individuals); id § 6011 (a) (requiring the
filing of a tax return by any person liable for taxes); i. § 6012(a)(1)(A) (requiring persons
whose gross income is equal to or greater than the exemption amount to file a tax return ); id
§ 6651 (listing penalties for failure to file a tax return or pay tax).
182. See id. § 7201 ("Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both, together with the costs of prosecution."); id § 7202 (providing for a felony charge for
"[w]illful failure to collect or pay over tax"); id § 7203 (providing for a misdemeanor charge
for "[w]illful failure to file return, supply information, or pay tax"); id. § 7206 (providing for
a felony charge for "[f]raud and false statements"). See generally 15 CARINA E. BRYANT,
MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 55A:04 (2007) (overview of criminal tax statutes);
d § 55A:05-27 (discussing specific tax provisions imposing criminal sanctions); 2
FREDERICK K. GRITTNER & NANCY SAINT-PAUL, WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
§ 1641, at 106-08 (4th ed. 2003) (describing penalties for violation of the tax code and
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would not push the intrusiveness of criminal law into a new and
inappropriately intimate sphere in the same way that a tort law duty to
rescue could.
While the above analysis suggests that a criminal duty to rescue
would be far more preferable than a corresponding tort law duty
should it be necessary to adopt one or the other, it does not argue for
the desirability of a criminal law duty to rescue. On the whole, the
analysis developed herein supports the continued absence of such
criminal statutes. Moreover, the enactment of a criminal law
obligation to reasonably rescue is likely to have an important effect on
the operation of tort law, even in the absence of an independent tort
law duty to rescue, as plaintiffs seek to hold defendants civilly liable
for the violation of the criminal statute under the doctrine of
negligence per se.
V1. CONCLUSION
On the whole, people expect that the law will articulate with
reasonable accuracy society's prevailing behavioral norms.' Criminal
law is thought to catalogue carefully a lengthy series of socially
undesirable behaviors and to threaten those who engage in them with
criminal sanctions. '  Tort law also is generally viewed as being
involved in a project of specifying certain unwanted harm producing
behaviors and responding to them with the threat of civil liability.'85
Arguments over whether certain behavior should or should not be
criminalized, or be made subject to tort law liability, usually focus on
procedures in tax penalty cases); Karen lafe et al., Tax Evasion, 31 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 875,
909-10 (1994) (discussing various violations of criminal tax statutes).
183. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 678 ("[A] major function of legal rules is to
mark out those social norms that the community regards as especially important. The
inclusion in the law of a duty to rescue a victim from physical peril sends the message that
members of a society owe one another an important obligation of due concern. The omission
of such a duty to rescue sends the message that due concern is not an important obligation.");
O.W Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) ("The law is the
witness and external deposit of our moral life."); Weinrib, supra note 32, at 264 ("[Mloral
duties not only provide a basis for judicial justification; they also provide a minimal standard
for legal legitimacy. If any legal obligations are legitimate, legal obligations that duplicate
preexisting moral ones must be.").
184. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions.- The Middleground Between
Ciminal and CivilLaw, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1807 (1992) ("We are accustomed to saying that
the purpose of the criminal law, in its most general sense, is control of antisocial behavior.").
185. See Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The
Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REv. 725, 727 (1992) ("Before World War II,
the central (though not exclusive) methodology in addressing tort problems was to make rules
that reflected, in a straightforward way, the social expectations of the laymen whose conduct
they governed.").
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whether the behavior in question is truly antisocial and undesirable,
whether it is objectionable enough to criminalize. '86
In this context, the continued absence in both criminal law and
tort law of a duty to reasonably aid a stranger in peril is perplexing. It
is especially puzzling in the case of tort law because the negligence
tort, in which such a duty would reside, is generally robust and hardly
modest about the scope of harm-producing behavior that it is willing to
second-guess formally. '87 Why would a cause of action through which
a plaintiff may question the reasonableness of a surgeon's subtle
judgments in the performance of a complicated procedure or an
engineer's highly technical decisions in the design of a complex
machine deny a victim the opportunity to second-guess a stranger's
complete failure to provide aid, even when that aid could have been
given easily and at little or no cost to the defendant?
This question is made more pointed by the fact that many other
countries, especially in Europe, have adopted an opposite position on
this issue and in fact do have laws, both criminal and civil, that require
a stranger to take affirmative action on behalf of another in peril.'
Moreover, the absence of such a duty in American law has been
roundly and regularly criticized by academics and laypersons alike.'89
Much of the energy fueling the continuing criticism of the doctrine
comes from the fact that the no-duty-to-rescue rule leaves the law
articulating a morally and socially monstrous position: that a citizen
need not so much as lift a finger to help a fellow citizen facing terrible
peril. How can this feature of American tort law continue year after
year in the face of these pressures?
This Article has offered a comprehensive justification for the
traditional absence in American tort law of a duty to reasonably rescue.
The framework for the analysis is not abstractly philosophical, nor is it
historical. It does not rely upon theoretical distinctions between
commissions and omissions or misfeasance and nonfeasance, nor does
186. See, e.g, Susan W Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the
Dissemination of Ideas and Data Be Criminalized, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 273, 422-23
(2003); Ira H. Carmen, Should Human Cloning Be Criminalized?, 13 J.L. & POL. 745, 750-
57 (1997); I. Neel Chatterjee, Should Trade Secret Appropriation Be Crinminalized 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 853, 855-56 (1997); see also Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the
Cime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 838 (2002) ("There is a sense in which we
reserve the criminal law for things that are 'really wrong' and not merely just socially
undesirable or inconvenient.").
187. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
188. See sources cited supra note 30.
189. See sources cited supra note 32.
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it suggest that the rule as it stands is the only logical extension of
Locke's or Hume's theory of the individual and the state. '9°
It is, instead, fundamentally instrumentalist in nature. The
existing rule is contrasted with its alternative, a tort law duty to
reasonably rescue that is understood to be part of the general duty of
reasonable care in negligence. The likely benefits and costs of an
affirmative duty-to-rescue rule are identified and discussed. The case
is developed in some detail that the very modest benefits that could be
expected from the adoption of an affirmative duty-to-rescue rule
would be overwhelmed by more than a half-dozen discrete costs. The
analysis leads to the conclusion that, on balance, the adoption of such a
duty within negligence law on instrumentalist grounds can simply not
be rationalized.
The discussion then turns to the question of specially trained
individuals and asks if a limited duty to rescue that would apply only
to them could be justified.'9  It cannot. However, an argument is
developed that recognizes that similar legal treatment of the specially
trained and the untrained is less than optimal in this area and also notes
that the current common law regime, even without an affirmative-duty
rule, may significantly discourage the specially trained to voluntarily
provide aid.' 92 It is in this context that the role and function of Good
Samaritan statutes are explained. 193
Finally, a comparison is made of an affirmative duty to reasonably
aid as a criminal law rule with that as a tort law doctrine.94 Because of
the existence of prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of criminal
statutes, a criminal duty to reasonably rescue can gratify the desire for
190. For a sample of the rich literature discussing the relevance to the no-duty-to-
rescue rule of a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, see Francis H. Bohlen,
The Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 218-20
(1908); Charles 0. Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DEPAUL L. REV.
30, 30-33 (1951); Fleming James, Jr., Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. REv.
778, 801 (1953). For a relatively recent and powerful critique of the importance of the
distinction between omissions and commissions in this context, see Jean Elting Rowe &
Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence ofAction and Inaction in the Law of Tort- Solving the
tuzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance Fiteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ.
L. REv. 807 (1995); Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 681 ("The autonomy argument against a duty
to rescue is often coupled with a distinction, said to be basic, between commissions and
omissions. The idea here is that it is proper to regulate commissions, but not omissions. That
idea, however, adds nothing to the autonomy argument, and is both flimsy and unwarranted
except to the extent that it simply restates the autonomy argument.").
191. See supra Part IVA.
192. See supra Part IVB.
193. See supra Part WC.
194. See supra Part V
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the law to articulate accurately the prevailing social value in this area at
much less cost than a tort law version of the duty. Prosecutors have the
opportunity to choose only those cases for enforcement that display
exceptional indifference on the part of the defendant so that an
appropriate signal regarding acceptable rescue behavior can be sent to
the public without incurring any of the difficult line-drawing costs that
would inevitably be associated with a tort law duty. In addition,
criminal law is far better able than tort law to fashion a sanction for the
defendant because the duty can be carefully tailored to the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct. Should a criminal law
version of a duty to rescue be adopted, the case for a tort law duty,
already small, diminishes substantially because most all of the benefits
available from a tort law duty would be achieved by the criminal law
duty, leaving an even more imbalanced scale of benefits to costs on the
tort side.
No matter how unsatisfying it may be for the law to fail to
embrace and articulate a widely shared social and moral value, and no
matter how tempting it is to threaten with legal liability those who fail
to display a common decency towards fellow humans facing serious
peril, it simply cannot be said that a general tort law duty to provide
affirmative aid to a stranger in peril is likely to do more good than
harm under current societal conditions. Of course, things may change.
Most importantly, the number of voluntary reasonable rescue efforts in
the absence of a coercive legal rule may significantly decrease or, even
more importantly, the present perception that the current level of such
voluntary efforts is quite high may change. Until then, however, the
long-standing absence in American tort law of a duty to reasonably
rescue can be expected to remain largely unchanged.
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